



Representations of the warrior-bishop in eleventh-century Lotharingia

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Given the legal proscriptions against clerics bearing arms, the biographers of bishops who engaged in warfare faced a difficult task when they attempted to justify their heroes' military activities. In eleventh-century Lotharingia, they did so by styling bishops as defenders of an oppressed populace. Two such biographies from Liège reach the opposite assessment of the warrior-bishop. Their contrasting tone reveals changes in attitudes about the relationship between the church and warfare over the course of the eleventh century, when issues of episcopal power and righteous violence dominated the discourse, not only at Liège but far beyond it.

'Arma episcopi lacrimae sunt et orationes'

Attributed to St Ambrose¹

The city of Liège, one of the major intellectual centres of Europe in the eleventh century, owed its foundation to a bishop's dramatic refusal to take up arms in his own self-defence. According to St Lambert's earliest *vita*, written in the eighth century, as the bishop's enemies are heard entering his residence with blood on their minds – to avenge actions taken by Lambert's kin – the saint awakens suddenly and draws his sword. Then, Lambert changes his mind, throws his sword to the ground, and reflects to himself: 'If I flee, I avoid the sword; if I remain, I must either fall or conquer. But I shall never lose the victory: it is better for me to die in the Lord than to lay hands, as a warrior, on the unjust'.² The

¹ In canon law, e.g. Gratian, *Decretum* II, causa 23, q. 8, ed. E. Friedberg (Leipzig, 1879), col. 953. Cf. Ambrose, *Sermo contra Auxentium* (Epist. 76a), ed. M. Zelzer, CSEL 82.3 (Vienna, 1982), p. 83. The passage was noticed by C. Erdmann, *The Origin of the Idea of Crusade*, trans. W. Goffart and M. Baldwin (Princeton, 1977), p. 15 n. 26. On this particular *questio* in Gratian, see below, n. 15.

² *Vita vetustissima Landiberti* (BHL 4677), ed. B. Krusch, *MGH SRM* 6 (Hanover, 1913), p. 368: '... nec mora commutans, gladio de manibus proiecit ad terram, ait: "Si fugiero, gladium devitavi; et si perstitero aut cadendum mihi est aut vicendum est (cf. Jerome, *Contra*

bishop then instructs his nephews to accept their fate as an exaction from God for the blood they had earlier spilt.

Lambert's legend was extensively reworked in subsequent centuries, and the causes and details surrounding his martyrdom were the most frequently elaborated-upon elements. The culpability for Lambert's murder that seemed to result from a private local feud in the early *vitae* becomes, in later layers of legend, extended to a conspiracy involving the Carolingian family.³ In its fullest manifestation, Lambert's murder is blamed on the jealousy of Pippin of Herstal's concubine, Alpaïda, after the bishop had rebuked the adulterous couple; his murderer, Dodo, referred to as a *domesticus Pippini* in the earliest *vita*, becomes Alpaïda's brother in texts from the eleventh century.⁴ And yet, throughout the various stages in the legend's development, the reflective scene just before Lambert's martyrdom remained largely consistent.

A closer look at the scene of Lambert's refusal of violence reveals subtle differences among the various redactions of the legend.⁵ The early rewritings of the *Vita Lamberti*, largely attempts to improve the Latin, make no significant change to the episode.⁶ In the early tenth century, when Lambert's liturgy and legend were revamped through the efforts of Bishop Stephen of Liège (901–20) – who himself rewrote the *vita* – the precise phrasing has been altered, but the essence of the action remains: Lambert throws his sword to the ground and recites the appropriate psalms.⁷ A contemporary poem on the saint's life does include a brief reflection on the unsuitableness of a minister of the altar to gird himself

Vigilantium I.16). Sed nec aliquando perdam victoriam: melius est mihi mori in Domino, quam super iniquis manibus [*sic*] bellaturus iniicere". Variants of the last phrase include: 'quam super iniquos manus bellaturus iniicere' and 'quam in impios bellantes manus iniicere'.

³ For the development of the legend, see Krusch in *MGH SRM* 6, pp. 328–38; and J.-L. Kupper, 'Saint Lambert: de l'histoire à la légende', *Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique* 79 (1984), pp. 5–49.

⁴ First made explicit in the late tenth-century *Annales Loblienses*, ed. G. Waitz, *MGH Scriptorum* 13 (Hanover, 1881), p. 227. There is almost enough evidence to suggest some sort of reality behind the legend, in part because the early linking of Dodo to Pippin seems unnecessary. Moreover, the earliest known devotees of Lambert's cult came from the family of Plectrude, Pippin's slighted 'legitimate' wife in the legend: see *Liber historiae Francorum* 50, ed. B. Krusch, *MGH SRM* 2 (Hanover, 1888), pp. 324–5 (on the murder of Grimoald in 714). However, the evidence provided by R.A. Gerberding, *The Rise of the Carolingians and the Liber historiae Francorum* (Oxford, 1987), pp. 118–19, who has most forcefully argued for the historical reality of the legend, stems from a later gloss of a manuscript of the *Liber historiae Francorum*.

⁵ For Lambert's death scene in general, see G. Scheibelreiter, 'Der Tod Landberts von Maas-tricht', in N. Fryde and D. Reitz (eds), *Bischofsmord im Mittelalter*, Veröffentlichungen des Max-Planck-Instituts für Geschichte 191 (Göttingen, 2003), pp. 51–82.

⁶ Texts which the Bollandists have designated with unique BHL numbers (e.g. BHL 4678–9) are better understood as stylistic improvements rather than full-scale rewritings, as would be the case with the *Vitae Lamberti* from the early tenth century onward. A better division of families of texts is provided by Krusch in *MGH SRM* 6, pp. 310–28.

⁷ Stephen of Liège, *Vita Lamberti* (BHL 4683), AASS Sept. V (Antwerp, 1755), col. 588A (Psalm LVIII.2 and LXXXV.14).

with weapons and armour.⁸ But one must wait until the mid-eleventh century for the episode to change. Anselm of Liège (an author to be dealt with closely in what follows) makes no mention of Lambert initially being drawn to his weapons and only later realizing that this response was inappropriate for a man of God. All hesitation vanishes along with all martial impulse; Lambert knows that the true warriors of Christ (*bellatores Christi*) achieve victory not by fighting but through martyrdom.⁹ What we will later see of Anselm's justifications of the military activities of bishops makes this particular editorial choice all the more intriguing. With Sigebert of Gembloux, who revised Lambert's legend in the late eleventh century, we have a return to the fuller narrative, which includes Lambert's initial hesitations to accept his fate passively.¹⁰ But again, in the mid-twelfth century, the canon Nicholas omits Lambert's moment of weakness just as Anselm had done. Instead of seizing the weapons of the world, the bishop grabs hold of the 'shield of faith' and the 'arms of prayer'.¹¹

The writers who chose to ignore Lambert's initial defensive impulse before his martyrdom – the cathedral canons Anselm and Nicholas – are the very ones who operated in a world in which violence under episcopal command found its greatest justification. Bishop Wazo (1042–8), the hero of Anselm's narrative, did not hesitate to pursue diocesan enemies with the material sword. At the time of Nicholas's rehashing of Lambert's legend a century later, the same patron's relics were being paraded around a castle on the southern edge of the diocese, where the bishop and his troops were besieging a recalcitrant castellan.¹² If one is willing to concede that the supernatural powers of Lambert's relics had largely resulted from his 'saintly' actions while alive, one cannot help but be struck by the irony. No one surrounding the castle of Bouillon in 1141 was thinking about the pacifism that Lambert displayed in his final moments.

Evidence from the early medieval world reveals the paradox of the warrior-bishop: continued legal prohibitions against clerics bearing arms

⁸ *Carmen de sancto Lamberto* (BHL 4682), ed. P. von Winterfeld, *MGH Poetae latini* 4.1 (Berlin, 1899), p. 152.

⁹ Anselm of Liège, *Gesta pontificum Leodiensium*, c. 7, ed. R. Köpke, *MGH Scriptores* 7 (Hanover, 1846), p. 194: 'statimque nichil reniti vel contramoliri querens, cum et posset, – sciebat enim quia bellatores Christi exemplo magistri moriendo quam pugnando norunt vincere – totum corpus in oratione prosternens, praeciosam constantissime mortem operitur'. The difference is also noticed by Scheibelreiter, 'Der Tod Landberts von Maastricht', p. 78.

¹⁰ Sigebert of Gembloux, *Vita Lamberti* (BHL 4687), ed. Krusch, *MGH SRM* 6, p. 402.

¹¹ Nicholas of Liège, *Vita Lamberti* (BHL 4688), AASS Sept. V, col. 615C: 'ad divinum confugit auxilium, et fidei scutum et consueta orationum arma corripiens'.

¹² For the details of the event, see D. Bachrach, *Religion and the Conduct of War, c. 300–1215* (Woodbridge, 2003), pp. 172–6.

on the one hand, a steady increase in the military responsibilities of bishops on the other.¹³ Carolingian statutes restricted clerics from the battlefield unless they were performing liturgical functions such as saying Mass or carrying relics.¹⁴ Later strains of canon law – often drawing from these statutes – permitted clergy to ‘exhort’ fighters to battle, and some might have seen this as easily enough extending to some form of military command.¹⁵ Defenders of the warrior-bishop consistently clung to legal technicality and claimed that bishops followed the canons as long as they did not themselves shed blood in battle. But others found such distinctions unsatisfactory, and a clear indication that certain bishops were too entrenched in worldly matters.¹⁶ More broadly, as Gratian himself realized, the issue of the fighting bishop cannot be fully divorced from the issue of legitimate violence in general.

Narrative accounts present a different story from the normative ones. Often enough we have mention of bishops presiding over troops, or even dying in battle, but heroic depictions of episcopal violence are rare. One well-known example is that of Bishop Gozlin of Paris (†886),

¹³ F. Prinz, *Klerus und Krieg im früheren Mittelalter: Untersuchungen zur Rolle der Kirche beim Aufbau der Königsherrschaft*, Monographien zur Geschichte des Mittelalters 2 (Stuttgart, 1971), gives a sustained treatment up through the tenth century.

¹⁴ Though there are earlier conciliar prohibitions, the first Carolingian pronouncement on the matter is in the 742 capitulary of Carlomann, heavily influenced by Boniface, who found warring clerics among the many problems of the Frankish church: c. 2, ed. A. Boretius, *MGH Capitularia* 1 (Hanover, 1883), p. 25: ‘Servis Dei per omnia armaturum portare vel pugnare aut in exercitum et in hostem pergere omnino prohibuimus, nisi illi tantummodo qui propter divinum ministerium, missarum scilicet solemnium adimplenda et sanctorum patronia portanda, ad hoc electi sunt.’ The wording is repeated verbatim in Charlemagne’s first capitulary (769), *ibid.*, pp. 44–5, and its later legal *Nachleben* includes Burchard of Worms, *Decretum* I.218, *PL* 140, col. 612; and Ivo of Chartres, *Decretum* V.332, *PL* 161, col. 424. The authenticity of the 769 capitulary has been challenged in earlier scholarship though defended by R. McKitterick, *Charlemagne: The Formation of a European Identity* (Cambridge, 2008), pp. 237–40. The most extensive (and interesting) Carolingian normative reflection on the military services of prelates comes from the forged capitularies of Benedictus Levita, *Capitularium collectio* II.370 and III.141, *PL* 97, cols 788–90 and 813–15, on which see M. McCormick, ‘The Liturgy of War in the Early Middle Ages: Crisis, Litanies, and the Carolingian Monarchy’, *Viator* 15 (1984), pp. 1–23, at pp. 14–15; Prinz, *Klerus und Krieg*, pp. 19–21; and Bachrach, *Religion and the Conduct of War*, pp. 37–8.

¹⁵ Approval of clerical exhortation in and to battle is the line ultimately taken by Gratian, *Decretum* II, causa 23, q. 8, cols 953–65, esp. c. 6, col. 954. Gratian goes further to justify the military obligations for those bishops possessing imperial *regalia*. On this complicated *questio*, see F. Russell, *The Just War in the Middle Ages* (Cambridge, 1975), pp. 76–84; and E.-D. Hehl, *Kirche und Krieg im 12. Jahrhundert: Studien zu kanonischem Recht und politischer Wirklichkeit*, Monographien zur Geschichte des Mittelalters 19 (Stuttgart, 1980), pp. 90–105. Gratian’s conclusion that bishops must ‘render to Caesar’ for the services attached to *regalia* (i.e. *praedia, villas, et castella*) appears in the earliest versions, though without the subsequent proof texts. See Sankt-Gallen, Stiftsbibliothek, 673, p. 164.

¹⁶ Two such authors were Peter Damiani and Pseudo-Fulbert, treated below, pp. 119 and 123–5, respectively.

killed while defending his city from the Vikings.¹⁷ Thietmar of Merseburg's account of the bishop of Regensburg, who lost his ear in battle against the Hungarians but kept killing while wounded on the battlefield is an extreme case.¹⁸ Hagiography in praise of bishops tends towards the other end of the spectrum.¹⁹ Many idealized depictions of a bishop involved in warfare describe him fearlessly rushing into battle armed only with the cross, liturgical robes, relics, and prayers.²⁰ For example, the *vita* of the tenth-century bishop Ulrich of Augsburg depicts the prelate organizing his city's defence while unarmed and unprotected amidst spears and rocks hurled by the besieging Hungarians.²¹

Paradox and irony, however, only get us so far. Medieval bishops wielded power. To wield power in a violent world requires recourse to force. Pacifism was just another Christian tenet untenable in the real world. But the issue of the warrior-bishop is one in which the historian can fruitfully study how contemporary writers negotiated the tricky task of representing their prelates' martial activities.

Like medieval writers, modern scholars continue to find different interpretations for the phenomenon of the warrior-bishop. Some have seen it as a result of the aristocratic milieu from which medieval bishops were drawn, the trappings of which they aimed to maintain in the face of the religious proscriptions of their office: the bishop who simply acted

¹⁷ Commemorated in Abbo of Saint-Germain-des-Prés' *Bella Parisiacae urbis*, ed. P. von Winterfeld, *MGH Poetae latini* 4.1, pp. 77–121, whose lament for the dead bishop highlights his martial role (p. 100): 'Nostra manens turris, clipeus necnon bis-acuta / Rumphea; fortis et arcus erat fortisque sagitta'.

¹⁸ Thietmar of Merseburg, *Chronicon* II.27, ed. R. Holtzmann, *MGH SRG*, ns 9 (Berlin, 1935), p. 72, who approvingly concludes: 'et fuit eiusdem mutilatio non ad dedecus, sed honorem magis'.

¹⁹ A reticence on the specifics of episcopal military activities applies to the larger genre of episcopal biography as well. See S. Haarländer, *Vitae episcoporum: eine Quellengattung zwischen Hagiographie und Historiographie, untersucht an Lebensbeschreibungen von Bischöfen des Regnum Teutonicum im Zeitalter der Ottonen und Salier*, Monographien zur Geschichte des Mittelalters 47 (Stuttgart, 2000), pp. 365–77 and 409–14. Haarländer's source-base, while extensive, excludes the genre of *gesta episcoporum*, and with it, testimonies such as Anselm of Liège's.

²⁰ This could be viewed as an extension of the scene in the fundamental episcopal *vita* of Martin of Tours, where the converted-soldier Martin declares himself a *miles Christi*, unable to fight but willing to encounter the enemy unarmed. Sulpicius Severus, *Vita Martini*, c. 4, ed. J. Fontaine, *Sources chrétiennes* 133 (Paris, 1967), p. 260. Cf. Anselm, *Gesta pontificum*, c. 54, pp. 221–2.

²¹ Gerhard of Augsburg, *Vita Udalrici* (BHL 8359), c. 12, ed. G. Waitz, *MGH Scriptores* 4 (Hanover, 1841), p. 401. And even in this case, Gerhard's text was revised shortly thereafter, due to its overemphasis on worldly matters. See D. Warner, 'Saints and Politics in Ottonian Germany', in N. Van Deusen (ed.), *Medieval Germany: Associations and Delineations* (Ottawa, 2000), pp. 7–28, at pp. 19–21. More generally, see G. Bühner-Thierry, 'De saint Germain de Paris à saint Ulrich d'Augsbourg: l'évêque du haut moyen âge, garant de l'intégrité de sa cité', in P. Boucheron and J. Chiffolleau (eds), *Religion et société urbaine au moyen âge: études offertes à Jean-Louis Biget par ses anciens élèves* (Paris, 2000), pp. 29–41, who rightly emphasizes the echoes of early episcopal hagiography, in which heroes defended their cities from the onslaught of the Huns.

like a lay lord, hunting often, perhaps drinking and boasting, and of course, warring.²² This view, most clearly expressed by Boniface in the eighth century, was often enough used in the Middle Ages by those seeking to criticize bellicose bishops.²³ But there were also positive explanations for the warrior-bishop, for example, the bishop as royal servant, who faithfully renders the military aid required by the *servitium* that he owed his ruler.²⁴ Refusal to do so could result in the more serious charge of treason.²⁵ The sources that I aim to treat here, those of Lotharingia and especially the diocese of Liège, offer another justification: the bishop who fights to protect his diocese from violent oppressors at a time when no one else could be counted on to do so. The bishop becomes a warrior of necessity, a warrior of last resort, and the very language invoked to justify his entry into the sphere of battle – for example, the necessity to protect his flock, especially the widows and orphans – in fact overlaps with responsibilities held to be royal ones.

We have a fairly straightforward tradition in canon law prohibiting clerics from bearing arms and participating in battle. We have numerous attestations in chronicles and annals of bishops violating these regulations, either by choice or by necessity, though often without a strong defence or condemnation of these actions. What distinguishes the late tenth and eleventh centuries from the longer history of the warrior-bishop are the efforts of episcopal biographers to justify their heroes' military exploits. These justifications, which often draw from biblical typology, reflect the concerns of their time, namely, the contemporary debate on the problem of episcopal power. While some sought to justify, others sought to condemn. A handful of texts from Lotharingia shows us

²² The inclusion of hunting prohibitions for clerics would seem to support this view; see above, n. 14.

²³ Prinz, *Klerus und Krieg*, esp. pp. 65–9. For the twelfth century, T. Reuter, 'Episcopi cum sua militia: The Prelate as Warrior in the Early Staufer Era', in T. Reuter (ed.), *Warriors and Churchmen in the High Middle Ages: Essays Presented to Karl Leyser* (London, 1992), pp. 79–93.

²⁴ An obligation stated most clearly by Hincmar of Reims, *Collectio de ecclesiis et capellis*, ed. M. Stratmann, *MGH Fontes iuris* 14 (Hanover, 1990), p. 120, on which see J.L. Nelson, 'The Church's Military Service in the Ninth Century: A Contemporary View?', *Studies in Church History* 20 (1983), pp. 15–30, repr. in J.L. Nelson (ed.), *Politics and Ritual in Early Medieval Europe* (London, 1986), pp. 117–32. Further ninth-century examples can be found in Prinz, *Klerus und Krieg*, pp. 115–46.

²⁵ This does not seem to have been the charge when Rather of Verona made excuses to get out of imperial *servitium* by appealing to the canons, *Epist.* 16 (written in 963), ed. F. Weigle, *MGH Die Briefe der deutschen Kaiserzeit* 1 (Weimar, 1949), p. 82: 'ut non permittunt canones clerico pugnare, ita nec stuprare'. Rather admits to performing his military duties in an earlier letter, though not ungrudgingly: *Epist.* 10, pp. 49–50. Rather's contemporary, Archbishop Frederick of Mainz, was less immune to the charge of negligence in this area. On these examples, see Prinz, *Klerus und Krieg*, pp. 27 and 187, respectively.

the range of these representations and allows us to track changes in attitudes towards episcopal bellicosity in the eleventh century.²⁶

The warrior-bishop forms part of the larger theme of the secular responsibilities entrusted to bishops. If one can already speak of episcopal lordships before the ninth century, then the ecclesiastical reforms and ensuing disorders of that century both led to increased episcopal power in the secular realm. This was especially true in northern Francia, where the mantle of civic defence in the face of Viking invasions often fell on bishops' shoulders. The steady increase in the 'militarization of the high clergy' throughout the early Middle Ages is the story traced by Friedrich Prinz, though he ends at the precise point when episcopal power in the secular sphere reached its apogee.²⁷ This occurred in the century preceding the Investiture Controversy, a conflict fought largely over these very responsibilities and who had the right to confer them.

From the mid-tenth century onward, powerful prelates sat on the *cathedrae* of Lotharingia, the territory that once formed the heartland of Charlemagne's empire, and which served as a bone of contention between the Ottonians and the Carolingian kings of France.²⁸ To gain an upper hand over the last Carolingians and the native Lotharingian aristocracy, Otto I leaned on the church. His highly learned younger brother, Bruno, combined in his own person the office of archbishop of Cologne with that of duke of Lotharingia (953–65).²⁹ The brothers in turn appointed loyal followers to Lotharingian bishoprics, which they then lavished with privileges; these privileges came attached with military obligations.³⁰

²⁶ M. Bur, 'À propos de la chronique de Mouzon: salut et libération dans la pensée religieuse vers l'an mil', *Francia* 14 (1986), pp. 45–56, discusses similar issues and sources to those treated here. He shows how powerful prelates of tenth- and eleventh-century Reims (and its environs) were likened to Old Testament judges in contemporary sources, which in turn exposed an absence of royal authority. The main differences between the following discussion and that of Bur are the treatment and explanation of the Liégeois sources, especially regarding the coherency of Anselm's narrative and the date and meaning of the *Vita Balderici*. Additionally, the *Vita Brunonis* is not presented here as a contrast to other contemporary biographies depicting warrior-bishops, but more so as a model.

²⁷ The phrase in quotations is from Prinz, *Klerus und Krieg*, pp. 115–46. For a brief yet insightful discussion of the issue in the tenth century, see H. Fichtenau, *Living in the Tenth Century: Mentalities and Social Orders*, trans. P. Geary (Chicago, 1991), pp. 203–10.

²⁸ For a recent survey of the *regnum quondam Lotharii* and its modern analysis, see S. MacLean, 'Shadow Kingdom: Lotharingia and the Frankish World, c. 850–c. 1050', *History Compass* 11 (2013), pp. 443–57.

²⁹ The earliest texts to mention this are Ruotger, *Vita Brunonis*, c. 20, ed. I. Ott, *MGH SRG*, ns 10 (Weimar, 1951), p. 20; and Widukind, *Res gestae Saxonicae* I.31, ed. P. Hirsch, *MGH SRG* [60] (Hanover, 1935), p. 44, who defends this practice by noting how Samuel – and many others – had been priests as well as judges (*sacerdotes pariter . . . et iudices*). Cf. Bur, 'À propos de la chronique de Mouzon', p. 49, who dismisses Widukind's allusion to Old Testament judges because it ignores Bruno's royal status.

³⁰ I will not here enter into the debate as to how 'systematic' was this arrangement of episcopal appointment and endowment by the Ottonian rulers, known in German scholarship as the *Reichskirchensystem*. Reuter's corrective, 'The "Imperial Church System" of the Ottonian and

Bruno's own martial activities are attested by the contemporary chronicler Flodoard: a besieged castle here, reinforcements there, treaties concluded, violators punished.³¹ Yet the full justification of these activities waited until a few years after Bruno's death, in his biography composed by a monk of the monastery that the archbishop had richly endowed as his final resting place. Ruotger's *Vita Brunonis* is a striking and novel episcopal biography, long since noticed as such.³² While it begins with the familiar theme of Bruno's intellectual precociousness and his revival of the liberal arts, it is clear that the main purpose of the *vita* was one of vindication, and in particular the vindication of Bruno's military exploits. For Ruotger, Bruno's achievement was the bringing of peace to Lotharingia, no small feat in light of previous and subsequent events. (*Pacificus* is a frequent epithet employed throughout the text.)³³ In perhaps the most remarkable passage among many, Ruotger addresses Bruno's detractors, who claim that bishops should not become involved in the affairs of the people and the dangers of war when their sole responsibility is the care of souls. His rebuttal: 'To these people, had they any sense, there was an easy answer if they considered the good of peace, as great as it was unusual, especially in those parts [i.e. Lotharingia], which was spread far and wide through this protector and teacher of a faithful people.'³⁴

In the eleventh century, this narrative tradition was expanded in the diocese of Liège, a suffragan of Cologne on its western border. Ruotger's

Salian Rulers: A Reconsideration', *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 33 (1982), pp. 347–74, is essential, not least because it points to the existence of similar practices outside the Reich. But it does not fully dismantle the paradigm. Cf. R. Schieffer, *Der geschichtliche Ort der ottonisch-salischen Reichskirchenpolitik*, Nordrhein-Westfälische Akademie der Wissenschaften G 352 (Opladen, 1998); and H. Hoffmann, 'Der König und seine Bischöfe in Frankreich und im Deutschen Reich 936–1060', in W. Hartmann (ed.), *Bischof Burchard von Worms: 1000–1025, Quellen und Abhandlungen zur mittelhochdeutschen Kirchengeschichte* 100 (Mainz, 2000), pp. 79–127. For a detailed treatment of the military duties of prelates under the Ottonians, see L. Auer, 'Der Kriegsdienst des Klerus unter den sächsischen Kaisern', *Mitteilungen des Instituts für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung* 79 (1971), pp. 316–407; 80 (1972), pp. 48–70.

³¹ Flodoard of Reims, *Annales*, s.a. 959–60, ed. P. Lauer (Paris, 1905), pp. 146–9.

³² E.g. H. Hoffmann, 'Politik und Kultur im ottonischen Reichskirchensystem: zur Interpretation der *Vita Brunonis* des Ruotger', *Rheinische Vierteljahrsblätter* 22 (1957), pp. 31–55; F. Lotter, *Die Vita Brunonis des Ruotger: ihre historiographische und ideengeschichtliche Stellung*, Bonner historische Forschungen 9 (Bonn, 1958), esp. pp. 115–28, for Ruotger's military language and justifications; Prinz, *Klerus und Krieg*, pp. 186–96; and more recently, H. Mayr-Harting, *Church and Cosmos in Early Ottonian Germany: The View from Cologne* (Oxford, 2007), pp. 1–63.

³³ And reiterated in Ruotger's closing verses, *Vita Brunonis*, p. 55.

³⁴ Ruotger, *Vita Brunonis*, c. 23, pp. 23–4: 'Causantur forte aliqui divinae dispensationis ignari, quare rem populi et pericula belli tractaverit, cum animarum tantummodo curam suscepit. Quibus res ipsa facile, si quid sanum sapiunt, satisfacit, cum tantum et tam insuetum illis presertim partibus pacis bonum per hunc tutorem et doctorem fidelis populi longe lateque propagatum aspiciunt, ne pro hac re quasi in tenebras amplius, ubi non est presentia lucis, offendant.' This passage has often been quoted; the translation above is taken from Mayr-Harting, *Church and Cosmos in Early Ottonian Germany*, p. 27.

Vita Brunonis was read there shortly after its composition. Bishop Notker of Liège (972–1008) in many ways assumed Bruno's role as the senior member of the Lotharingian episcopate, and though not related to the Ottonians by blood, he was among their closest advisers.³⁵ No shirker of his martial obligations, he reportedly devoted a full third of ecclesiastical revenues to the maintenance of the episcopal militia.³⁶ Poetic verses composed shortly after Notker's death evoke images of the bishop's sternness in the face of enemies and the value of preserving peace within the diocese. Notker, the *miles Christi*, combats heresy and harshly punishes the violators of the church with anathema, exile, and even death, though there is no mention here of actual battles.³⁷

Contemporary sources from the neighbouring dioceses of Utrecht and Cambrai project a different sentiment. Not only does a late tenth-century episcopal biography from Utrecht seem to criticize the practice of military obligations foisted upon bishops, but in an account of Bishop Ansfrid (995–1010) – a count and layman prior to his elevation – the emphasis is placed squarely on his abandonment of the secular life of warfare for the pastoral staff of peace.³⁸ Better known to historians is the position taken by Bishop Gerard of Cambrai (1012–51) when faced with regional pressure to participate in the burgeoning 'Peace of God' movement. For Gerard, this was a usurpation of royal duties, and as such, clearly a transgression for the order of *oratores*.³⁹ At Toul, the southern-

³⁵ See the classic study by G. Kurth, *Notger de Liège et la civilisation au Xe siècle* (Brussels, 1905), pp. 56–114; and recently, A. Wilkin and J.-L. Kupper (eds), *Évêque et prince: Notger et la Basse-Lotharingie aux alentours de l'an Mil*, Série Histoire 2 (Liège, 2013).

³⁶ Anselm, *Gesta pontificum*, c. 29, p. 206. Cf. J.-L. Kupper, *Liège et l'Église impériale. XIe–XIIIe siècles* (Paris, 1981), p. 434.

³⁷ *Versus ad Nokerum*, ed. K. Strecker, *MGH Poetae latini* 5.2 (Berlin, 1939), pp. 491–2 (the verses only survive in fragments later incorporated into a twelfth-century *Vita Notgeri*). See J. Maquet, 'Le droit et la justice, deux instruments politiques entre les mains de Notger', in Wilkin and Kupper (eds), *Évêque et prince*, pp. 369–94, at pp. 370–3.

³⁸ The aforementioned critique is in the *Vita Radbodi* (BHL 7046), c. 9, ed. O. Holder-Egger, *MGH Scriptores* 15.1 (Hanover, 1887), pp. 571a–b, on which see B. Ahlers, *Die ältere Fassung der Vita Radbodi*, Europäische Hochschulschriften, ser. 3: Geschichte und ihre Hilfswissenschaften 55 (Bern, 1976), pp. 70–5. The account – or rather panegyric – of Ansfrid is in Alpert, *De diversitate temporum* I.11–17, ed. G.H. Pertz, *MGH Scriptores* 4, pp. 705–9. I would like to thank David Bachrach for reminding me of this text, which he has recently translated: *War and Politics in Medieval Germany, ca. 1000*, Mediaeval Sources in Translation 52 (Toronto, 2012), pp. 21–31 (on Ansfrid).

³⁹ G. Duby, *The Three Orders: Feudal Society Imagined*, trans. A. Goldhammer (Chicago, 1980), pp. 21–43 and *passim*, focuses much on Gerard's famous speech in the *Gesta episcoporum Cameracensium* III.52, ed. L. Bethmann, *MGH Scriptores* 7, pp. 485–6. Cf. T. Riches, 'Bishop Gerard I of Cambrai-Arras, the Three Orders, and the Problem of Human Weakness', in J.S. Ott and A.T. Jones (eds), *The Bishop Reformed: Studies of Episcopal Power and Culture in the Central Middle Ages* (Aldershot, 2007), pp. 122–36; and *idem*, 'The Peace of God, the "Weakness" of Robert the Pious and the Struggle for the German Throne, 1023–5', *EME* 18 (2010), pp. 202–22.

most diocese of Lotharingia, tensions about the bishop's duties are very well hidden, but there, in contemporary sources.⁴⁰

The heart of what follows is an exploration of two sources from Liège that display the broad spectrum of how the warrior-bishop could be depicted. The first, written by a cathedral canon the 1050s, extols the bishop as the 'defender of the patrimony' (*defensor patriae*). The second, written at the turn of the twelfth century, portrays the bishop as a repentant sinner after a lost battle. Much of this difference may have simply depended on the success of the military venture in question. After all, these narrative justifications were all written after the fact, and what served as a better statement of God's negative judgement against a bishop's martial activities than the defeat and destruction of his contingents?⁴¹ Nonetheless, a case can also be made for a change in rhetoric if not attitudes at Liège in the course of the eleventh century, precipitated by the reaction to the reform papacy's position on righteous violence. The theme of the warrior-bishop at Liège brings us to the heart of the eleventh-century reform movement, Lotharingia's influence upon it, and some of the ways in which it played out ideologically in one of the most important cultural centres in the empire.

Anselm of Liège (1050s)

Anselm's *Gesta pontificum Leodiensium* continues the earlier episcopal history written in the late tenth century. Anselm's portion treats bishops from the seventh century up through the recently deceased Bishop Wazo (†1048), his own mentor. Anselm's desire to glorify Wazo's character and actions, or rather to defend them in the face of critics, served as the primary reason why he undertook to continue the *gesta* in the first place, which also explains why the chapters devoted to Wazo equal the combined length of those treating all the preceding bishops.⁴² But Anselm did

⁴⁰ Unearthed by the excellent detective work of J. Nightingale, 'Bishop Gerard of Toul (963–994) and Attitudes to Episcopal Office', in Reuter (ed.), *Warriors and Churchmen*, pp. 41–62. It is particularly notable that the *Vita Gerardi* (BHL 3431), a text commissioned by Bishop Bruno before he became Pope Leo IX, contains no mention of these tensions. (On Leo IX, see below, pp. 118–20.)

⁴¹ A vivid account of an episcopal-led militia gone wrong comes from the pen of Andrew of Fleury, writing about Archbishop Aimon of Bourges's activities in 1038, only a few years prior to Wazo's tenure: *Miracula sancti Benedicti* V.1–4, ed. E. de Certain (Paris, 1858), pp. 192–8, on which see T. Head, 'The Judgment of God: Andrew of Fleury's Account of the Peace League of Bourges', in T. Head and R. Landes (eds), *The Peace of God: Social Violence and Religious Response in France Around the Year 1000* (Ithaca, 1992), pp. 219–38. Cf. D. Barthélemy, 'The Peace of God and Bishops at War in the Gallic Lands from the Late Tenth to the Early Twelfth Century', *Anglo-Norman Studies* 32 (2010), pp. 1–23, for a further discussion of the 'peace militias' of the eleventh century.

⁴² I.e., bishops from Theodard († c. 670) to Nithard (†1042): Anselm, *Gesta pontificum*, c. 2–38, pp. 192–210.

not restrict his *apologia Wazonis* to the chapters on Wazo – he incorporated this defence into the earlier biographies. If Anselm could show that Wazo acted in the tradition of his predecessors, then he could counter the notion that Wazo's tenure marked a new era in the relations between bishop and emperor which, in reality, it seems to have done. Episodes of Wazo standing up to the emperor's meddling in ecclesiastical affairs are frequently found in Anselm's narrative.⁴³

Anselm often describes prelates engaged in warfare. What at first seems like a contradiction – as mentioned earlier, Anselm is adamant about Lambert's refusal to take up arms in his defence – is rather a delineation of the circumstances in which bishops could legitimately participate in war. Lambert would have only defended himself, and as Anselm states, the saint realized that Christ's warriors conquered by dying rather than fighting.⁴⁴ Later warrior-bishops, however, were champions of the people, defenders of the episcopal *patria* (a term that is ubiquitous in the sources at this time).⁴⁵ For Anselm, Lambert and Wazo were both *bellatores Christi*, but of quite a different type.

Anselm's first warrior-bishop, Franco (c.855–901), held office during the troubled time of the Viking incursions. Anselm did not invent Franco's military exploits; we know of them, for example, through contemporary poems by the Irish scholar Sedulius.⁴⁶ A tradition from the monastery of Lobbes, recorded by its abbot, tells of how Franco, because of his many battles against the Vikings, had resigned his duties at the altar and had two clerics ordained in his place. Emphasis is placed on the fact that Franco's resignation was due to his actual spilling of blood, and thus, in violation of the canons.⁴⁷ Anselm includes this detail from Folcuin, but was no slave to his source. His dramatic account of Franco's resistance to

⁴³ As a result, Anselm should be viewed as a major source on the early aspects of eleventh-century tensions between *regnum* and *sacerdotium*. See, e.g., K. Leyser, 'On the Eve of the First European Revolution', in T. Reuter (ed.), *Communications and Power in Medieval Europe: The Gregorian Revolution and Beyond* (London, 1994), pp. 1–19, esp. pp. 4–7; on Wazo more generally, see Kupper, *Liège et l'Église impériale*, pp. 130–4, 293, 383–7 (and the bibliography cited therein).

⁴⁴ See above, n. 9.

⁴⁵ See J. Lejeune, 'Les notions de *patria* et d'*episcopatus* dans le diocèse et le pays de Liège du XIe au XIVe siècle', in *Problèmes liégeois d'histoire médiévale*, Anciens pays et assemblées d'états 8 (Louvain, 1955), pp. 3–53, esp. pp. 9–23; cf. T. Eichenberger, *Patria: Studien zur Bedeutung des Wortes im Mittelalter (6.–12. Jahrhundert)*, Nationes 9 (Sigmaringen, 1991), who largely avoids equating *patria* with the diocese.

⁴⁶ Sedulius Scottus, *Carmina*, ed. L. Traube, *MGH Poetae latini* 3 (Berlin, 1886), nos. 18–19, pp. 185–6. Sedulius praises Bishop Hartgar for a victory over the Vikings in 851–2, and it seems likely that his poem on the triumphal entry of Franco into Liège also commemorates a victory in battle. Cf. A. D'Haenens, *Les invasions normandes en Belgique au IXe siècle: le phénomène et sa répercussion dans l'historiographie médiévale* (Louvain, 1967), pp. 103–5 and pp. 199–200.

⁴⁷ Folcuin of Lobbes, *Gesta abbatum Lobensium*, c. 17, ed. Pertz, *MGH Scriptores* 4, p. 62. Cf. Anselm, *Gesta pontificum*, c. 19, pp. 199–200.

the Vikings has the bishop acting 'for the sake of widows and orphans in the vindication of their freedom', and describes how the bishop 'fought boldly and frequently against the foreign enemy until at last, with God's aid, he liberated the *patria* from such a plague of invaders'.⁴⁸ One significant detail that Anselm was happy to omit was the involvement of the local count, Reginar the Longneck (†915), whom Folcuin credits jointly with the bishop for the local defence. Anselm erases the count's part in the affair completely; by Anselm's time, the bishops of Liège had considerable troubles with Reginar's descendants.⁴⁹ More important was the belief that the fundamental political unit was the diocese, which by the eleventh century was a full-fledged ecclesiastical principality. Anselm changes the story of Franco and the Vikings in another crucial way by providing an explanation as to why the Vikings were attacking in the first place: their raids were God's vengeance visited upon the land for the sins of the king. This was close enough in time to the famous divorce case of Lothar II for Anselm to link Lothar's actions to the Viking attacks.⁵⁰ The warrior-bishop emerges not only from a failure of royal power, but in order to protect the people from disasters brought about by the king's own shortcomings.

The martial theme continues in Anselm's biographies of two tenth-century bishops, Everacrus and Notker, though here the stress is laid on their faithful fulfilment of obligations owed to the emperor. These German-speakers were imperial appointees (Everacrus was a student of Bruno of Cologne). In addition to their fulfilment of imperial duties, Anselm credits these bishops with the reinvigoration of the schools of Liège, where they shone forth as good examples and teachers.⁵¹ Anselm's account of Notker was especially important because he styles Wazo as Notker's intellectual heir. But unlike these earlier bishops, Wazo appears in Anselm's narrative as largely unwilling to command the episcopal militia for operations on an imperial scale, preferring to limit the use of force to diocesan interests.

Anselm's fullest defence of the warrior-bishop comes through in his deeds of Wazo. He of course praises Wazo for things other than skill in military matters: his keen intellect, his charity, his legal expertise, and his

⁴⁸ Anselm, *Gesta pontificum*, c. 19, p. 199: 'pro viduarum et orphanorum causis in libertatem vindicandis arma sumpsisse, in barbaros hostes sepiissime fortiter dimicasse, donec a tanta pervasorum peste cum Dei adiutorio patriam liberaverit'.

⁴⁹ As is evident in the events described in the *Vita Balderici*, treated below, pp. 113–17.

⁵⁰ It is interesting to note that the *Annales Lobienses*, s.a. 870, pp. 232–3, the probable source for both Folcuin and Anselm, has it that the clerics ordained in Franco's stead at Rome had been sent there initially as legates for the divorce case of Lothar II. See also Regino of Prüm, *Chronicon*, s.a. 867 and 869, ed. F. Kurze, *MGH SRG* [50] (Hanover, 1890), pp. 93–8, who had earlier linked Lothar II's marital problems with his military ones.

⁵¹ Anselm, *Gesta pontificum*, c. 24–30, pp. 201–6.

willingness to stand up to the emperor when the latter encroached upon the rights of the church. But Wazo also stood up for the material rights of the church and the populace at the local level, and frequently organized the defence of the vulnerable city of Liège. Protection of the ecclesiastical patrimony involved clashes with would-be lords in the diocese and the indigenous nobility often in revolt against Emperor Henry III. In these circumstances, Wazo bound a small band of vassals (*satellites*) to himself and the church through an oath.⁵² With this optic, Wazo's local struggles could always be styled as in the interests of the emperor, and so, in fulfilment of his obligations – or such was the hope.

One account told by Anselm is particularly revealing. Having been roused by the misery and groans of the poor and needy, Wazo decides to attack an illegal castle in the diocese. Anselm states that 'nothing is more pleasing to God, than to restrain the wild madness of thieves from oppressing the innocent populace'. Thief/brigand (*praedo*) is code here for warriors not under Wazo's jurisdiction, and at the end of this vignette, we learn that they are the men of the rebellious duke of Lotharinga, Godfrey the Bearded (†1069).⁵³ Wazo remains at the centre of action, not only by inventively organizing the siege machinery in order to attack the naturally fortified site, but also by beseeching God's aid through prayers and psalms.⁵⁴

It is always about liberating the *patria* for Anselm, where *patria* is coterminous with the diocese. In fact, there is no evidence that Wazo ever engaged in military activity outside of his own diocese, and it was for this reason in particular that Wazo was called out for being negligent in the fulfilment of his imperial obligations. Anselm recounts two episodes in which Wazo patently refused to deploy the episcopal militia beyond the diocese, even when it would have been in the interests of the emperor.

⁵² Anselm, *Gesta pontificum*, c. 55, p. 222: 'et non alio modo cessantibus undique ducum et comitum armis, sola spe gratiae caelestis adiutus, sibi et fidelitate aeclesiae paucos satellites sacramento confirmat'. The significance of this act was not lost on Erdmann, *The Origin of the Idea of Crusade*, p. 74; see also H. Hoffmann, *Gottesfriede und Treuga Dei*, Schriften der MGH 20 (Stuttgart, 1964), pp. 88–9.

⁵³ Anselm, *Gesta pontificum*, c. 55(bis), p. 222: '... nichil esse beatius, nichil Deo acceptius, si efferatam praedonum rabiem ab innocentis vulgi oppressione compesceret'. For Godfrey's rebellion see E. Boshof, 'Lothringen, Frankreich und das Reich in der Regierungszeit Heinrichs III', *Rheinische Vierteljahrsblätter* 42 (1978), pp. 64–127; as well as the observations of T. Reuter in his essay, 'Peace-Breaking, Feud, Rebellion, Resistance: Violence and Peace in the Politics of the Salian Era', trans. J.L. Nelson in *Medieval Politics and Modern Mentalities* (Cambridge, 2006), pp. 355–87.

⁵⁴ Anselm, *Gesta pontificum*, c. 55(bis), pp. 222–3. Wickerwork and twigs were employed to transport the machines across the rough and swampy terrain. One wonders whether Vegetius's *De re militari* formed part of Wazo's reading; the fourth book would have encouraged an expertise in siege machinery. Lobbes had a copy at this time: see F. Dolbeau, 'Un nouveau catalogue des manuscrits de Lobbes aux XIe et XIIe siècles', *Recherches augustiniennes* 13 (1978), pp. 3–36, no. 173.

The first occurred when a countess in a neighbouring diocese sought to betray her husband and his allies by switching her allegiance to Henry III. She calls upon Wazo to appear at a set time and place with his forces (*cum armatis*), but the bishop declines, perhaps thinking it was a trap. (Anselm attributes the entire affair to the mutable female mind.)⁵⁵ Wazo's second refusal to muster troops beyond diocesan limits had far greater repercussions. In this case, imperial forces were preparing to mount a northern offensive against the Frisians in order to give the bishop of Utrecht some relief. Wazo, knowing from the failures of previous decades that warfare involving boats and islands put the Liégeois forces at a distinct disadvantage, judged the endeavour too risky (and indeed the battle ended badly for the imperial army).⁵⁶ A campaign on the northern reaches in Frisia did not fall within Wazo's efforts to liberate his own flock from oppression, but nonetheless formed part of his *servitium* to the emperor. Wazo was later publicly charged for negligence in this affair and forced to pay an indemnity of three hundred silver marks for his absence. The way in which this matter played out is highly significant, at least in Anselm's retelling.⁵⁷ Wazo was humiliated at court, where the aged prelate was refused a seat, forced to pay restitution to the emperor, and thus implicitly admit his wrongdoing in the matter. Wazo continued to harbour resentment against the emperor for this affair, even on his deathbed.⁵⁸ Significantly, Anselm chooses the reprimand of Wazo to voice his strongest critique of the emperor's encroachment into the ecclesiastical sphere.⁵⁹

Like Ruotger's text, Anselm's is an apology addressed to the late bishop's critics. This defence is brimming with metaphors and parallels, likening Wazo to a range of both historical and biblical figures. These comparisons often occur when the narrative turns to war: Wazo is the hundred-eyed Argus in vigilance on the walls of Liège and 'our Cato' for his unshakable commitment to justice. And while the image of St Martin is floated about, it is not to insist on a passive, spiritual battle. Though Wazo is never depicted as shedding blood himself, Anselm does not shy

⁵⁵ Anselm, *Gesta pontificum*, c. 59, p. 224. The countess in question was Richilde of Hainaut (†1086), whose power base was at Mons in the diocese of Cambrai.

⁵⁶ Hermann of Reichenau, *Chronicon*, s.a. 1047, ed. G.H. Pertz, *MGH Scriptores* 5 (Hanover, 1844), p. 127. On the earlier disastrous campaign at Vlaardingingen, see the testimony of Alpert, cited below, n. 63.

⁵⁷ Anselm, *Gesta pontificum*, c. 66, pp. 229–30.

⁵⁸ Anselm, *Gesta pontificum*, c. 70, p. 233.

⁵⁹ Anselm, *Gesta pontificum*, c. 66, p. 230. After Wazo protests the emperor's treatment of him as an anointed priest, the emperor responds by exalting his own royal unction. In what is probably the most quoted line from Anselm's text, Wazo distinguishes royal and priestly unction, the former *ad mortificandum* and the latter *ad vivificandum*; he continues, 'unde quantum vita morte praestantior, tantum nostra vestra unctione sine dubio est excellentior'.

away from placing Wazo in actual military command.⁶⁰ But the real treasure trove for warfare in God's name was found in the Old Testament: God appointed 'his Joshua' to defend the church; Samuel and Elijah are invoked in their bloodiest biblical scenes, Samuel as he hacked the king of the Amalekites to pieces, and Elijah as he executed the many priests of Baal.⁶¹ If Wazo was nearly equal to Gregory the Great in his capacities as a pastor, in his capacities as a warrior he was a match for Judas Maccabeus.⁶²

Vita Balderici (c.1100)

Our next text is a later source about an earlier bishop, whose tenure was marked by military defeat. Indeed, Wazo's own reluctance to fight the Frisians in 1046 may have reflected lessons drawn from similar circumstances some thirty years earlier.⁶³ Balderic II (1008–18) was the immediate successor of the illustrious Notker, though he differed from him in important ways. For one thing, despite serving as the emperor's chaplain, Balderic was a local candidate, whose family was based within the diocese, and whose uncle of the same name had held the bishopric in the mid-tenth century. These family ties led to conflicts of interest. But despite the aims of his relatives, Balderic seems to have remained loyal to Emperor Henry II. In fact, the major military clashes

⁶⁰ Here I must part ways with Bur, 'À propos de la chronique de Mouzon', pp. 52–3, who sees these inconsistencies in Anselm as revealing 'un certain flottement de la pensée', even going so far as to suggest that certain 'touches de caractère néotestamentaire' might be later interpolations. Bur does however see in Anselm's depiction of Wazo the closest parallel to his main case, that of Adalbero of Reims in the *Chronicon Mosomense*. J. Flori, *La guerre sainte: la formation de l'idée de croisade dans l'Occident chrétien* (Paris, 2001), p. 149, prefers to emphasize Wazo's personal passivity and thus underestimates the bishop's significance as a military commander.

⁶¹ Anselm, *Gesta pontificum*, c. 55(bis), p. 222: I Samuel XV.33; I Kings XVIII.

⁶² Anselm draws the parallel between Wazo and Mathathias, the instigator of the revolt and father of the more famous brothers Maccabee, and most significantly, a priest: *Gesta pontificum*, c. 55, p. 222. Comparison to the Maccabees would soon come to be a standard trope for the anti-imperial stance of the Gregorians, even though this is not quite the portrait that Anselm wishes to paint. The Maccabees clearly fight against a corrupt authority, and in the Investiture Controversy, this was the charge levelled against Henry IV. See J. Dunbabin, 'The Maccabees as Exemplars in the Tenth and Eleventh Centuries', in K. Walsh and D. Wood (eds), *The Bible in the Medieval World: Essays in Memory of Beryl Smalley* (Oxford, 1985), pp. 31–42; and Bur, 'À propos de la chronique de Mouzon', pp. 53–4.

⁶³ The fullest account of the battle of Vlaardinghen (1018) comes from Alpert, *De diversitate temporum* II.21, pp. 719–20 (trans. Bachrach, pp. 68–72). According to the *Vita Balderici*, c. 27, ed. Pertz, *MGH Scriptores* 4, p. 735, Balderic initially pleads illness, but changes his mind after the duke accuses him of infidelity; the bishop becomes ill along the way and dies the day of the battle. No mention of this hesitancy appears in the *Gesta episcoporum Cameracensium* III.19, p. 471, which has Balderic falling ill en route; Anselm, *Gesta pontificum*, c. 31, p. 207, notes that Balderic died at the very hour of the battle.

of Balderic's career involved his own cousin, Count Lambert of Louvain.⁶⁴

The main confrontation seems to have been precipitated by Balderic (and probably indirectly, by the emperor), when the bishop began building a castle at Hoegaarden, a mere fifteen kilometres from Louvain, in a clear effort to circumscribe the count's power.⁶⁵ Count Lambert's resistance to this effort eventually led to a pitched battle at Hoegaarden in which the episcopal forces were routed and devastated. Anselm, well placed to report on this significant military defeat, makes no mention of it. That task is left to the *Vita Balderici*, which treats the failed warrior-bishop in a unique way and for this reason is the outlier of the Lotharingian tradition.

The *Vita Balderici* was a product of a monk at Saint-Jacques, writing at the turn of the twelfth century.⁶⁶ He was writing not just the life of his monastery's founder but also the specific circumstances and motives behind its establishment, which the monks by that time had ascribed to the commemoration of those killed at the battle of Hoegaarden in 1013.⁶⁷ As a result, a significant portion of the *vita* treats the build-up to the battle and its aftermath.

The heart of the narrative describes the confrontation between Balderic and Lambert, and begins with the latter's opposition to the new fortification. Unsatisfied with the bishop's assurance that the castle was in

⁶⁴ Count Lambert (†1015) stemmed from the powerful Reginar clan. He and his brother Reginar IV were banished from Lotharingia by Bruno of Cologne, but were slowly rehabilitated at the end of the tenth century. The *Gesta episcoporum Cameracensium* III.5, pp. 467–8, mentions Lambert's blood relationship to Balderic II (who was from the family of the counts of Loos) as the reason why the bishop and the count had initially entered into an alliance. See Kupper, *Liège et l'Église impériale*, pp. 119–21.

⁶⁵ This castle-building followed a failed siege of Louvain by the Lotharingian duke, Godfrey (1012–23), acting on behalf of the emperor. Sigebert, *Chronica*, s.a. 1012, ed. L. Bethmann, *MGH Scriptores* 6 (Hanover, 1844), p. 355. See C. Lays, *Étude critique sur la Vita Balderici episcopi Leodiensis* (Liège, 1948), pp. 102–3.

⁶⁶ Arguments on the date of the *Vita Balderici* have ranged from the mid-eleventh century to as late as the end of the twelfth. In his review of Lays' study, C. Dereine, 'Note sur la date de la *Vita Balderici*', *Scriptorium* 3 (1949), pp. 137–9, first proposed to date the text to the first years of the twelfth century. His observations were based on both internal and external evidence: the former being a better understanding of the reference to the 'senioribus nostris qui adhuc supersunt', to whose oral testimony the author appeals (c. 20, p. 732), and the latter an annotation in an eighteenth-century catalogue of manuscripts at Saint-Jacques that referred to a now-lost manuscript of the *Vita Balderici* as 'écrit en 1108'. Haarländer, *Vitae episcoporum*, pp. 488–91 succinctly lays out the full argument for dating the *Vita Balderici* to the first years of the twelfth century, to which she adds her own sound observation that the contemporary problems with Lambert's descendants mentioned in the *Vita Balderici*, c. 25, p. 734 ('cuius tamen adhuc genus ut videmus in praesentiarum est infidum', which Pertz misidentified as a reference to a Baldwin of Louvain), likely refers to Count Godfrey of Louvain (†1139), with whom the bishop of Liège had had a dispute in 1095.

⁶⁷ The sole surviving manuscript of this text (Liège, Bibliothèque de l'Université, 162), gives the subtitle, fol. 120r: 'libellus qualiter, Deo donante, locus iste sit fundatus'.

no way meant to impede Louvain, Lambert moves quickly from threats of violence to acts of violence. At the outset of the confrontation, the bishop appears exemplary, doing everything right to check the aggression of the count, warning him first to change course, and then hurling the spear of excommunication, to which the count pays no heed. Balderic only moves to violence after consultation with the people of Liège; everyone agreed that clemency and leniency were no longer of use – alternatives to force had all been exhausted.⁶⁸ The justification here is very close to Anselm's account of Wazo: the ravages of oppressors must be checked for the sake of the populace. Much of the language is similar (save for Anselm's portentous calls for ecclesiastical liberty).⁶⁹ The author of the *Vita Balderici* is careful to specify that even though the bishop knew it was better to use the shield of prayer than the visible sword, he was beset by the most serious necessity (*gravissima necessitas*) to proceed to battle.⁷⁰

This well-justified set-up makes the turn of events all the more surprising. After initial successes in which the episcopal forces put Lambert's men to flight, one of the bishop's counts defects to the enemy, resulting in the slaughter of much of the episcopal militia.⁷¹ This act of betrayal – always a strong explanation for military failure, especially in medieval sources – is not dwelt upon by our author, despite the fact that he insists that this detail was related orally by the older members of the community.⁷² Instead, Balderic's biographer turns to the devastating effect that news of the defeat had on the people of Liège. The reaction moved from 'pity to compassion, from dread to numbness, then from numbness to silence, and finally from silence to sighs [of grief]'.⁷³ The failure of the bishop's justified actions led some to question whether this world was even governed by divine providence, which in turn led them to question whether their prayers were of any use to the souls of the fallen. The force of the lament and the hopelessness of the populace make this episode stand out among contemporary narrative sources.

⁶⁸ *Vita Balderici*, c. 9, p. 728.

⁶⁹ E.g. *Vita Balderici*, c. 8, p. 727, where the bishop reflects that 'non esse alium defensorem praeter Deum et se ipsum; ecclesiae dampnis, orphanorum lamentis consulendum, potencie insani hominis (ne magis insolesceret per licentiam) fortiter occurrendum'.

⁷⁰ *Vita Balderici*, c. 10, p. 728: 'quamvis sciret, pro huiusmodi calamitate magis utendum esse orationis clipeo quam visibili gladio, gravissima circumventus necessitate, paratis militum copiis, ad conserendam procedit cum hostibus manum'.

⁷¹ According to the *Vita Balderici*, c. 10, p. 728, Count Robert of Namur switched sides when he saw the battle was going poorly for Count Lambert, to whom he was related. Beyond wounded and captured, the author puts the death toll at three hundred men. For an account closer to the events, see *Gesta episcoporum Cameracensium* III.5, pp. 467–8.

⁷² *Vita Balderici*, c. 10, p. 728.

⁷³ *Vita Balderici*, c. 11, p. 728: 'Successit pietati compassio, timori stupor, stupor silentium, silentio suspirium; pro timphano et choro, pro cithara et psalterio, quaedam inordinatae vocis confusio.'

The bishop also falls into deep remorse. He delivers a moving soliloquy, in which he blames himself for the catastrophe, calling himself a murderer, guilty for so many deaths.⁷⁴ He asks God why He had not protected the devout militia, which set out in defence of the poor, and looks once again to God's aid to help quell the great confusion that now plagued the people. What happens next is also peculiar; the narrative shifts abruptly to follow the career of an Italian bishop named John, who, on account of his artistic skill had earlier been recruited by Otto III to decorate the palace at Aachen. John subsequently joins the entourage of Balderic and becomes his close confidant.⁷⁵ It is this Italian colleague who consoles Balderic – by then in a very bad state – though this consolation begins with rebuke. John reminds the bishop that leading an army in a worldly fashion was a great sin for a priest. He then urges Balderic to construct an altar in the manner of King David, in order to assuage God and merit the pardon of the people.⁷⁶

There are many ways that one can interpret the stance on the warrior-bishop in the *Vita Balderici*. The most obvious draws us to the biography's purpose and circumstances of composition: because the foundation of Saint-Jacques was intended to commemorate those fallen at the battle of Hoegaarden, the bishop's remorse formed a necessary component of the story. But it should be noted that the *vita's* explanation for the establishment of Saint-Jacques does not accord well with sources closer to the events;⁷⁷ indeed, the *Vita Balderici* is very selective in its narrative.⁷⁸ It seems more likely that the *Vita Balderici* reflects a tradition that developed in the course of the eleventh century, and perhaps, rather rapidly towards the end of it. One could imagine a scenario in which the betrayal by the count of Namur formed a much more prominent role in the oral tradition of the battle of Hoegaarden preserved at Saint-Jacques, which

⁷⁴ *Vita Balderici*, c. 12, p. 729: 'Ego, ego huius ruinae causa, ego homicida, me vox sanguinis horum accusat, me partium arguunt studia.'

⁷⁵ That is, after the promised episcopal appointment in Italy falls through. On this character, see G. Kurth, 'Le peintre Jean', *Bulletin de l'Institut archéologique liégeois* 33 (1903), pp. 220–31; and Lays, *Étude critique sur la Vita Balderici*, pp. 112–15. This tradition extended beyond the *Vita Balderici*: Gilles of Orval reproduces the epitaph above John's apparent tomb at Saint-Jacques: *Gesta episcoporum Leodiensium* II.61, ed. J. Heller, *MGH Scriptores* 25 (Hanover, 1880), p. 65.

⁷⁶ *Vita Balderici*, c. 16, p. 731; cf. II Samuel XXIV.25.

⁷⁷ The chronological inconsistencies in the *Vita Balderici* (most important, a donation to Saint-Jacques from Count Arnoul of Valenciennes, who died before 1013) suggest that the monastery was underway before the battle of Hoegaarden, and that the author's justification for his monastery's foundation was inaccurate. Lays, *Étude critique sur la Vita Balderici*, pp. 118–30, treats the evidence in detail and concludes that 'la version donnée par la Vita sur la foundation de Saint-Jacques est un tissu de mensonges' (p. 127).

⁷⁸ E.g., it makes no mention of the battle of Florennes in 1015 in which Lambert of Louvain met his ultimate demise at the hands of forces under Duke Godfrey, on which see *Gesta episcoporum Cameracensium* III.9–12, p. 469 (Balderic is conspicuously absent amidst his Lotharingian colleagues in the subsequent peace made with Lambert's nephew and son).

was downplayed by the author of the *Vita Balderici* in favour of a clear focus on the theme of clerical violence.

On a simpler level, there is no real justification for a failed warrior-bishop because his very failure was proof of his culpability. The author of the *Vita Balderici* calls the tragedy at Hoegaarden 'the hidden yet never unjust judgement of God'.⁷⁹ In the face of defeat, righteous justification falls away, since this society believed that God ultimately decides victories; this was especially true on the slippery slope of ecclesiastical involvement in war.⁸⁰ If Wazo was ever bested in one of his diocesan skirmishes, Anselm tells nothing of it. And again it bears repeating that Anselm is reticent on the battle of Hoegaarden. The *Vita Balderici* refers once to Wazo, whom Balderic had raised to the office of cathedral dean. Following this mention, the author reflects on the bishop who defends justice – a reference to Balderic, but one which might also apply to Wazo: 'Things do not always turn out for an honest man as hoped; although he seems to fight for justice against the enemies of peace, instead, for the increase of his merits, he is overwhelmed by the weighty pressures of this life.'⁸¹

The Reform papacy and violence

How should one explain the opposing sentiments expressed in Anselm's *Gesta pontificum* and the *Vita Balderici*? Are we here witnessing the attitudes of secular clerics running up against monastic sensibilities? (Eleventh-century Liège had a high concentration of both groups.)⁸² This is possible, though unlikely in my view. Instead, the chronological distance between these two texts better explains their different tone. Times had most certainly changed in the years between Anselm (1050s) and the *Vita Balderici* (c.1100). Indeed, the intervening decades witnessed the

⁷⁹ *Vita Balderici*, c. 11, p. 728.

⁸⁰ Though cf. the tenacity with which the Gregorians, especially in the 1080s, clung to newly formulated justifications of righteous violence in the face of (or rather because of) so few military successes. See below, pp. 120–1.

⁸¹ *Vita Balderici*, c. 6, p. 727: 'quia probro viro non semper eveniunt optata licet contra hostes pacis videatur pugnare pro iusticia, immo pro meritorum augmentis gravibus huius vitae obruitur pressuris'. Lays, *Étude critique sur la Vita Balderici*, p. 100 n. 3, sees Pertz's inclusion of these phrases following the mention of Wazo to be a transition which properly belongs in the subsequent chapter. But Pertz's c. 7, p. 727, which begins, 'Sed iam ad ipsas causas veniamus', seems like a fair transition.

⁸² On the tension between monks and canons at Liège, see H. Silvestre, 'Sur une des causes de la grande expansion de l'ordre canonial dans le diocèse de Liège aux Xe et XIe siècles', *Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire* 31 (1953), pp. 65–74. C.S. Jaeger, *The Envy of Angels: Cathedral Schools and European Social Ideals, 950–1200* (Philadelphia, 1994), pp. 209–10, emphasizes that Anselm, though himself a cathedral canon, privileged cloistered living and learning for clerics.

most intense debate on the nature of clerical involvement in the world and the issue of legitimate authority (and therefore, legitimate force) in the whole of the Middle Ages.⁸³

Though he writes earlier, it was Anselm's conceptualization of the problem that was to have the larger immediate impact. The justifications of episcopal involvement in warfare, formulated in Lotharingia, found their way to Rome. The pivotal figure in this regard is Pope Leo IX (1049–54), who, before his appointment by the emperor as pope, was bishop of Toul in upper Lotharingia. We learn from his biographer of his effective organization of Toul's episcopal militia, for which he was responsible while on campaign with the emperor in Italy prior to his elevation to the episcopate.⁸⁴ Upon elevation to the papacy, Leo famously chose a group of Lotharingian churchmen to accompany him to Rome; they would become part of his inner circle of reform. Foremost among them was the archdeacon of the cathedral of Liège, Frederick, who eventually became pope himself as Stephen IX (1057–8).

Leo IX's military campaigns as pope, especially those against the Normans in southern Italy, bear a striking resemblance to Wazo's activities only a few years earlier; the scale was of course grander, and the stakes higher.⁸⁵ But Leo too saw the Normans as predators encroaching upon his flock and the papal patrimony, and in a letter to the Byzantine emperor justifying papal actions after the fact, he deploys the same notions of liberation from oppression seen in Anselm and others.⁸⁶

Leo IX however, like Balderic of Liège, had to deal with defeat, crushing defeat, at the hands of the Normans at Civitate in 1053, resulting in his extended captivity. Despite the efforts of Leo's biographers to put

⁸³ For an exploration of the sources, in addition to Erdmann, see I.S. Robinson, *Authority and Resistance in the Investiture Contest: The Polemical Literature of the Late Eleventh Century* (Manchester, 1978); and L. Melve, *Inventing the Public Sphere: The Public Debate during the Investiture Contest (c. 1030–1122)*, Brill's Studies in Intellectual History 154, 2 vols (Leiden, 2007).

⁸⁴ *Vita Leonis IX* (BHL 4818), I.7, ed. H.-G. Krause, *MGH SRG* 70 (Hanover, 2007), p. 108: 'ipse auxiliarias militum copias imperatori venientes a Tullo ducendas et disponendas suscepit tam eiusdem episcopi quam augusti placito: salvo tamen per omnia proprii gradus sacramento'. (This *vita* comes from a cleric of Toul, see Krause's introduction, pp. 1–6.) The last phrase assures us that Leo's activities never crossed the line of the oath of his particular office (at that time, deacon) to not participate in actual combat. As pope, Leo did promulgate a canon at the 1049 council of Reims prohibiting clerics from bearing arms: c. 6, ed. D. Jasper, *MGH Concilia* 8 (Hanover, 2010), pp. 240–1.

⁸⁵ Leo IX was not the first pope to resort to warfare; canonists and crusade historians alike have often looked for precedents in papal actions taken against Muslims in the vicinity of Rome in the mid-ninth and early tenth centuries: see Erdmann, *The Origin of the Idea of Crusade*, pp. 25–8.

⁸⁶ The letter (JL 4333), ed. C. Will, *Acta et scripta quae de controversiis ecclesiae Graecae et Latinae saeculo undecimo composita extant* (Leipzig, 1861), pp. 85–9, was likely written by the Lotharingian monk Humbert of Silva Candida, who brought it with him to Constantinople in 1054. A large excerpt was inserted into the *Vita Leonis IX* II.20, pp. 224–8. See Erdmann, *The Origin of the Idea of Crusade*, pp. 120–3.

a positive spin on this defeat by claiming that the casualties of the papal army were now martyrs in heaven – itself a harbinger of things to come – many remained convinced that Leo's actions were wrong.⁸⁷ The most notable among them, Peter Damiani, denounced Leo's bellicosity (which extended beyond the single event at Civitate), and asserted that bishops must never resort to violence, no matter how dire the situation.⁸⁸ Even the staunch Gregorian bishop Bruno of Segni was forced to question the pope's personal leadership of the forces against the Normans.⁸⁹

The fight over Leo IX's posthumous reputation between those wishing to paint him as a faithful member of the *Reichskirche* and those using the proto-Gregorian brush began shortly after his death.⁹⁰ When the pro-Norman historian, Amatus of Montecassino, later recounted the battle of Civitate, he endeavoured to deflect the culpability for the failed papal campaign away from Leo IX by laying the bulk of the blame on the papal chancellor, Frederick. Not only is Frederick made to taunt the Normans prior to the confrontation, but Amatus credits the chancellor with the refusal of Norman overtures for peace and the urging of the pope foolishly to battle.⁹¹ During his own brief pontificate

⁸⁷ *Vita Leonis IX* II.21, p. 228. The martyrdom of the fallen soldiers is even more explicit in the account of Leo's death written by the bishop of Cervia (BHL 4818m–n), ed. A. Poncelet, *Analecta Bollandiana* 15 (1906), pp. 289–90 and 294–5 (cf. BHL 4819–20, AASS Apr. II (Antwerp, 1675), pp. 666 and 668–9). See Erdmann, *The Origin of the Idea of Crusade*, pp. 123–5.

⁸⁸ Peter Damiani, *Epistola* no. 87, ed. K. Reindel, *MGH Die Briefe der deutschen Kaiserzeit* 4.2 (Munich, 1988), pp. 505–15 (written in 1062). This letter is a general reflection on the problem of ecclesiastical involvement in warfare, or as Damiani puts it (p. 509): 'utrum aeccliesiarum rectores expetere vindictam debeant, ut malis mala more saecularium reddant'. Damiani stresses that the action must be separated from the person, and asks if Peter was given responsibility for the church *because* he had denied Christ; Damiani also notes that Gregory the Great and Ambrose never met their oppressors with violence (p. 514). On the legacy of Damiani's condemnation during the debates of the subsequent generation, see Robinson, *Authority and Resistance*, pp. 98–9.

⁸⁹ Bruno of Segni, *Libellus de symoniacis*, c. 5, ed. E. Sackur, *MGH Libelli de lite* 2 (Hanover, 1892), p. 550: 'Zelum quidem Dei habens, sed non fortasse secundum scientiam, utinam non ipse per se illuc isset, sed solummodo illuc exercitium pro iusticia defendenda misisset!' Bruno was likely writing in the late 1090s, close in time to the *Vita Balderici*. Kupper (see next note), p. 280 n. 24, suggests that *scientia* here might refer to military know-how, but it is an allusion to Romans X.2.

⁹⁰ M. Chazan, 'Léon IX dans l'historiographie médiévale de l'Europe occidentale', in G. Bischoff and B.-M. Tock (eds), *Léon IX et son temps* (Turnhout, 2006), pp. 589–621. In the same proceedings, J.-L. Kupper, 'Le pape Léon IX, l'Empire et l'Église impériale', pp. 273–84, at pp. 279–81, draws comparisons between Leo IX and Wazo of Liège.

⁹¹ Amatus, *Ystoire de li Normant* III.24, ed. V. de Bartholomeis, *Fonti per la storia d'Italia* 76 (Rome, 1935), p. 140, has Frederick say mockingly, 'se je avisse cent chevaliers effeminat, je combatteroie contre tuit li chevalier de Normendie'. For the meeting immediately before the battle, where Frederick continues his threats: *ibid.*, III.39, p. 154. On this testimony, see H. Taviani-Carozzi, 'Une bataille franco-allemande en Italie: Civitate (1053)', in C. Carozzi and H. Taviani-Carozzi (eds), *Peuples du moyen âge: problèmes d'identification* (Aix-en-Provence, 1996), pp. 181–211, at p. 190. There are some problems with Amatus's text, as it only comes down to us in a fourteenth-century French translation.

as Stephen IX, Frederick would continue a fierce policy of resistance to Norman power.⁹² Amatus's accusation, if at all founded, connects clerical belligerence more closely to Liège (and to Wazo's circle).⁹³ In the end, however, Leo IX needed no lesson on the martial necessities of episcopal power – he was trained in a similar Lotharingian episcopal milieu.⁹⁴

It was left to Gregory VII (1073–85) to reach the point of no return of church-sanctioned violence, the developments and consequences of which are well traced in Carl Erdmann's masterpiece.⁹⁵ Gregory's own bellicosity is noticeable already in the first years of his pontificate, when a resurfacing of troubles with the Normans prompted a couple of papal letters to be signed 'data in expeditione', and as the pope harboured plans to aid the Greeks with an army that he himself would lead.⁹⁶ But it was during the ensuing Investiture Controversy that an ideological justification of violence against the enemies of the church was fully worked out. This task was not Gregory's, who preferred action to theory, but instead fell to his associates in the 1080s, especially Anselm of Lucca and Bonizo of Sutri. They were the ones who laid the foundation for the church's position on legitimate force that was to have

⁹² And he would draw from the treasury of Montecassino to do so: Amatus, *Ystoire de li Normant* III.50, pp. 166–7; *Chronicon monasterii Casinensis* II.97, ed. H. Hoffmann, *MGH Scriptores* 34 (Hanover, 1980), p. 355; see M. Stroll, *Popes and Antipopes: The Politics of Eleventh Century Church Reform*, Studies in the History of Christian Traditions 159 (Leiden, 2012), pp. 61–7. The hostile papal attitude towards the Normans would change with the Treaty of Melfi (1059).

⁹³ Kupper, 'Le pape Léon IX', p. 282. Evidence does not permit us to know Frederick's precise stance during the revolt of his brother, Godfrey the Bearded, in the 1040s, of which Wazo bore the brunt (see above, n. 53). We only hear of the emperor's wrath extending to Frederick in the 1050s, when Godfrey revolted yet again. See Boshof, 'Lothringen, Frankreich und das Reich', pp. 107–8.

⁹⁴ On Bruno/Leo's command of the militia of Toul, see above n. 84. It is unknown whether Bruno/Leo aided Wazo in his efforts against Godfrey; as pope, he played the leading role in Godfrey's reconciliation with Henry III in 1049. See Boshof, 'Lothringen, Frankreich und das Reich', pp. 77–8 and 98–9.

⁹⁵ Cited frequently above and below, Erdmann's work was originally published as *Die Entstehung des Kreuzzugsgedankens*, Forschungen zur Kirchen- und Geistesgeschichte 6 (Stuttgart, 1935). To single out a few of the many subsequent works on this theme: I.S. Robinson, 'Gregory VII and the Soldiers of Christ', *History* 58 (1973), pp. 169–92; N. Housley, 'Crusades against Christians: Their Origins and Early Development, c. 1000–1216', in P.W. Edbury (ed.), *Crusade and Settlement: Papers Read at the First Conference of the Society for the Study of the Crusades and the Latin East and Presented to R.C. Smail* (Cardiff, 1985), pp. 17–36; and more recently, G. Althoff, 'Selig sind, die Verfolgung ausüben': *Päpste und Gewalt im Hochmittelalter* (Stuttgart, 2013), which, as its title suggests, focuses on the exegesis of biblical passages that fuelled the discourse on papal justifications of violence.

⁹⁶ Gregory VII, *Registrum* I.84–5 (JL 4872–3), ed. E. Caspar, *MGH Epistolae selectae* 2.1 (Berlin, 1920), pp. 120–3; Erdmann, *The Origin of the Idea of Crusade*, pp. 161–9; and H.E.J. Cowdrey, 'Pope Gregory VII's "Crusading" Plans of 1074', in B.Z. Kedar, H.E. Mayer and R.C. Smail (eds), *Outremer: Studies in the History of the Crusading Kingdom of Jerusalem Presented to Joshua Prawer* (Jerusalem, 1982), pp. 27–40.

such an impact in subsequent centuries.⁹⁷ By advocating violence on behalf of the church as a Christian duty (especially against schismatics and heretics), while disavowing direct ecclesiastical leadership in any campaigns, they attempted to thread the needle of the church's involvement in war.⁹⁸ It was a subtle distinction that did not sit well with many involved in the debate. The imperial polemic against the Gregorians is consistent in its sustained condemnation of the disorder and violence in the name of the 'freedom of the church'.⁹⁹ In what Erdmann considers a high point of this polemic, the *Liber de unitate ecclesiae conservanda* from the monastery of Hersfeld in the 1090s, those bishops siding with Gregory are denied status as pastors and instead called 'war generals' and 'slayers of both souls and bodies'.¹⁰⁰

Throughout the conflicts that wracked the German empire in the last decades of the eleventh century, the bishops of Liège remained staunch imperial supporters.¹⁰¹ Liège was itself one of the main centres of polemical literature on behalf of the imperialist cause, and some of the best work came from the monk Sigebert of Gembloux, one of the hagiographers of St Lambert that we encountered at the outset. In 1103 Sigebert was commissioned by the archdeacon of Liège to refute Pope Paschal II's call to the count of Flanders, now returned from the surprising success in Palestine and occupied with enforcing the pope's will on the city of Cambrai, to attack the city of Liège and its 'pseudo-clerics' (the pope's words). According to the pope, no greater gift can be offered to God than

⁹⁷ Augustine's writings against the Donatists helped provide the patristic foundation: see Erdmann, *The Origin of the Idea of Crusade*, pp. 241–56, esp. pp. 244–5; and K.G. Cushing, *Papacy and Law in the Gregorian Revolution: The Canonistic Work of Anselm of Lucca* (Oxford, 1998), pp. 122–41.

⁹⁸ Cushing, *Papacy and Law in the Gregorian Revolution*, p. 136, notes that Anselm seems to be disavowing his own participation in battle in his *Liber contra Wibertum*, ed. E. Bernheim, *MGH Libelli de lite* 1 (Hanover, 1891), p. 525. Also revealing is Bonizo's stance on the matter: *Liber de vita christiana* II.43, ed. E. Perels, *Texte zur Geschichte des römischen und kanonischen Rechts im Mittelalter* 1 (Berlin, 1930), p. 56.

⁹⁹ It is there from the beginning in Henry IV's famous letter (no. 12) of 1076, ed. C. Erdmann, *MGH Deutsches Mittelalter* 1 (Leipzig, 1937), p. 16: 'ferro sedem pacis adisti et de sede pacis pacem turbasti . . .' This rhetoric continues, e.g. in Wenrich of Trier (in Lotharingia) in the 1080s. See Robinson, *Authority and Resistance*, pp. 60–5 and 95–100, who emphasizes the influence of the imperial epistolary rhetoric on subsequent polemics.

¹⁰⁰ *Liber de unitate ecclesiae conservanda*, c. 18, ed. W. Schwenkenbecher, *MGH Libelli de lite* 2, p. 234: 'quales scilicet episcopi non essent pastores ecclesiarum, sed ductores bellorum, non custodes dominiarum ovium, sed ut graves lupi persecutores earum, interfectores animarum pariter et corporum, cum ipsi ad tuendas partes suas diu multumque usi fuissent manibus impiorum ad occisionem multorum hominum'. Erdmann, *The Origin of the Idea of Crusade*, pp. 260–2; and on this text more generally, Robinson, *Authority and Resistance*, p. 193; and Melve, *Inventing the Public Sphere*, pp. 423–548.

¹⁰¹ Indeed, Liège was one of the last cities to remain loyal to Henry IV, opening its gates to him in 1106, during his son's rebellion; the beleaguered emperor died there later that year. See I.S. Robinson, *Henry IV of Germany, 1056–1106* (Cambridge, 1999), pp. 338–44.

to fight against his enemies.¹⁰² Sigebert's rebuttal, another high point in the anti-Gregorian polemic, is completely pacifist in tone, and seeks, through copious biblical references, to take away the right of the church to sanction violence. The polemics against the papacy did not attack the ideals of ecclesiastical reform, but rather the violent methods to which Gregory and his successors were willing to resort in order to achieve them. After dozens of biblical citations and exegetical argumentation, Sigebert asks, 'From where does the pope have this authority that beyond the spiritual sword he may bring forth the other sword of slaughter against his subjects?'¹⁰³ According to Sigebert, Gregory VII broke with the tradition of his predecessors when he girded himself with the *gladius belli*.

The *Vita Balderici* was likely composed at precisely this time and place, and it coincides nicely with this brief and limited shift in argumentation.¹⁰⁴ I say limited, because even as it was being written the bishop of Liège had no time to follow its lessons. No contemporary viewed Bishop Otbert (1091–1119) as a pacifist.¹⁰⁵ One of the last services that this most loyal imperialist rendered to Henry IV took the form of military aid against the latter's rebellious son.¹⁰⁶ While the struggle over investitures

¹⁰² Sigebert reproduces Paschal II's brief letter (JL 5889) at the outset of his response: *Epistola Leodicensium adversus Paschalem papam* 1, ed. E. Sackur, *MGH Libelli de lite* 2, p. 452: 'Nullum profecto gratius Deo sacrificium offerre poteris, quam si eum impugnes, qui se contra Deum erexit.' On Paschal's views, see Housley, 'Crusades against Christians', pp. 20–1. Cf. Anselm's language in n. 53 above; the language has shifted from oppressors of the populace to those 'who have placed themselves against God'. Papal aggression was directed towards Liège in part because its bishop had provided help – in the form of troops – to the imperial candidate of Cambrai, Walcher. On the immediate circumstances and Sigebert's treatise, A. Cauchie, *La Querelle des Investitures dans les diocèses de Liège et de Cambrai*, 2 vols (Liège, 1890–1), II, pp. 154–80, is still useful. See also Robinson, *Authority and Resistance*, pp. 175–9.

¹⁰³ Sigebert of Gembloux, *Epistola Leodicensium adversus Paschalem papam* 10, p. 461: 'unde haec auctoritas apostolico, ut praeter spirituale gladium exerat in subiectos alterum occisionis gladium?' (Sigebert's reference to Gregory VII/Hildebrand is at p. 462). At the end of the letter, as Sigebert questions what he sees as an excessive indulgence to warriors (a papal grant forgiving past and future sins without confession or penance), he exclaims: 'quantam fenestram maliciae per hoc patefecisti hominibus!' (c. 12, p. 464). This rhetoric was noted by Erdmann, *The Origin of the Idea of Crusade*, pp. 262–4. Housley, 'Crusades against Christians', p. 19, notes Gregory's failure to link his promises of forgiveness of sins with the penitential system as clearly as his successors would. See also Robinson, 'Gregory VII and the Soldiers of Christ', p. 182. Sigebert had already levelled an attack on the violent methods of the Gregorians in his *Apologia contra eos qui calumniantur missas coniugatorum sacerdotum* 2, ed. E. Sackur, *MGH Libelli de lite* 2, p. 438. Remember that this same Sigebert reintroduced St Lambert's bellicose thinking and immediate regret back into the saint's legend.

¹⁰⁴ Gembloux and Saint-Jacques had ties dating back to Abbot Olbert (†1048), Sigebert's teacher and first abbot of Saint-Jacques.

¹⁰⁵ Though he did manage to get himself labelled the 'standard bearer of the Antichrist and pack horse of Satan', by Urban II, *Epistolae et privilegia*, no. 125 (JL 5538), *PL* 151, col. 396. Kupper, *Liège et l'Église impériale*, p. 452 n. 25, notes the complaint from the monks of Saint-Hubert that Otbert had personally attacked them 'usque ad sanguinem effusionem': *Cantatorium*, c. 90, ed. K. Hanquet (Brussels, 1906), p. 236.

¹⁰⁶ Episcopal forces aided in the victory over those of Henry V at Visé in 1106; see Robinson, *Henry IV*, p. 339.

may have resulted in a clearer distinction between the sacred and secular aspects of the bishop's office, it did not reduce the latter.¹⁰⁷ What had been true for a long time was obvious by the twelfth century: episcopal duties were so ponderous that those who excelled in secular administration ended up making better bishops.¹⁰⁸ Did this in turn make bishops even more willing to involve themselves in warfare? Twelfth-century imperial prelates were notorious for their warring.¹⁰⁹

When, in 1141, the bishop of Liège gave a rousing speech to his army encamped before the castle of Bouillon, he evoked the same *defensor patriae* language and Old Testament examples of the previous century, though by now warfare in the name of the church was well entrenched and reinforced by the new crusading ideal. But in this case, even the bishop's promise of eternal rewards did not suffice; further support was needed, and the army gained the confidence to proceed with the siege only when the relics of St Lambert were ceremoniously brought out from their resting place in the cathedral.¹¹⁰

An appropriate text with which to conclude is a letter forged under the name of Bishop Fulbert of Chartres (†1028) directly treating the issue of the warrior-bishop.¹¹¹ Written in the early twelfth century, this letter-treatise adopts the techniques of the polemical writers of the previous decades (and not those of Fulbert) by marshalling a slew of biblical and patristic proofs on the duties of the bishop while noting that military involvement is never mentioned in any of them. Those prelates that ignore the New Testament precepts of peace are not to be considered bishops but rather tyrants. Among the many patristic citations employed, one finds a reference to the *De XII abusivis saeculi*, a fundamental source for the medieval genre of princely mirrors.¹¹² Pseudo-Fulbert uses this text to drive home the point that the responsibility for the punishment of evils

¹⁰⁷ The classic study remains R.L. Benson, *The Bishop-Elect: A Study in Medieval Ecclesiastical Office* (Princeton, 1968).

¹⁰⁸ This held true not only for dioceses of the Holy Roman Empire: see C.B. Bouchard, *Spirituality and Administration: The Role of the Bishop in Twelfth-Century Auxerre*, Speculum Anniversary Monographs 5 (Cambridge, 1979).

¹⁰⁹ See Reuter, 'Episcopi cum sua militia', pp. 79–93. For the bishops of Liège in particular, see the later sources cited by Kupper, *Liège et l'Église impériale*, p. 452 n. 31.

¹¹⁰ Such is the narrative presented by the *Triumphus sancti Lamberti de castro Bullonio* (BHL 4690), ed. W. Arndt, *MGH Scriptores* 20 (Hanover, 1868), pp. 498–511 (Bishop Albero's speech is at pp. 503–4).

¹¹¹ F. Behrends, 'Two Spurious Letters in the Fulbert Collection', *Revue bénédictine* 80 (1970), pp. 253–75 (edition at pp. 263–9). Behrends (p. 261) places this letter in a Belgian or north-eastern French milieu. In many earlier discussions of clerical involvement in warfare (and even a few more recent ones), this letter has been taken as genuine.

¹¹² This text, falsely attributed to St Cyprian, played a role in the Investiture Controversy: Robinson, *Authority and Resistance*, pp. 115–16. For its earlier context, see R. Meens, 'Politics, Mirrors of Princes and the Bible: Sins, Kings and the Well-Being of the Realm', *EME* 7 (1998), pp. 345–57.

by force belongs not to bishops, but to the secular power – to kings.¹¹³ That Pseudo-Fulbert's borrowed list of royal obligations omits actions that could have been identified as 'episcopal' by 1100 exposes an underlying problem: the conflation of royal and episcopal duties.¹¹⁴

For our purposes, the most important overlap of these duties pertains to the protection of the poor and defenceless. As this principle would later come to form an essential component of the knightly ethic of chivalry, its presence in justifications of the warrior-bishop is quite revealing.¹¹⁵ From the basis of biblical precepts, the protection of widows, orphans, and others initially fell under ecclesiastical purview. Subsumed into royal responsibility in the mid-ninth century,¹¹⁶ it becomes thereafter a mainstay in royal coronation liturgies, often emphasized at the point in the ceremony in which weapons are being blessed.¹¹⁷ Thus it appears that before this 'chivalric' ethic to protect the defenceless could pass from royal to knightly prerogatives – a descent also channelled through the church – for a time bishops, or at least a group of them, had to assume (or rather resume) the task themselves.

Ruotger, Anselm, and others were well aware of the prohibitions, but their defence was predicated on extraordinary circumstances, where evils had to be ranked accordingly. At the end of his long letter, Pseudo-Fulbert makes an emphatic plea for the bishop's responsibility for the cause of widows and orphans. This is precisely the point for Anselm: the bishop's duty to feed and protect his flock extended to protecting them from the endemic predatory lordship of the time, and this duty trumped the prohibitions on clerical violence in cases where the bishop was the populace's only bulwark against violence and slaughter. Pseudo-Fulbert is aware of this justification – itself a suggestion that the forgery comes from a time

¹¹³ In this respect it is reminiscent of the argument made by the real Fulbert's contemporary, Gerard of Cambrai, as he challenged those swearing oaths for the enforcement of peace without royal oversight. See above, n. 39.

¹¹⁴ Pseudo-Fulbert, ed. Behrends, 'Two Spurious Letters', p. 266, adapted from *De XII abusivis saeculi*, c. 9, ed. W. Hartel, CSEL 3.3 (Vienna, 1871), p. 166; some duties omitted from the original include: 'advenis et pupillis et viduis defensorem esse . . . iniquos non exaltare, inpudicos et histriones non nutrire . . . ecclesias defendere, pauperes eleemosynis alere . . .'

¹¹⁵ This is the view of J. Flori, *L'idéologie du glaive: préhistoire de la chevalerie*, Travaux d'histoire éthico-politique 43 (Geneva, 1983), who places great stress on the particular language of the protection of the defenceless.

¹¹⁶ Flori, *L'idéologie du glaive*, pp. 77–8. The 829 council of Paris did much to reinforce these notions and made extensive use of the *De XII abusivis saeculi* at 2.1(55), ed. A. Werminghoff, *MGH Concilia* 2.2 (Hanover, 1908), p. 650. On the importance of this council and its subsequent influence, see S. Patzold, *Episcopos: Wissen über Bischöfe im Frankenreich des späten 8. bis frühen 10. Jahrhunderts*, *Mittelalter-Forschungen* 25 (Ostfildern, 2008), pp. 149–68 and *passim*.

¹¹⁷ Flori, *L'idéologie du glaive*, pp. 84–102. Most relevant for the time and place treated above is the *Pontificale Romano-Germanicum* (c. 960), ordo 72, ed. C. Vogel, 3 vols (Vatican City, 1963–72), I, pp. 255–6. See also, e.g., *Ordines coronationis Franciae*, ed. R. Jackson, 2 vols (Philadelphia, 1995–2000), I, pp. 163 and 209.

and place where these types of actions as well as their rationales were well known – but he will have none of it.¹¹⁸ Clerics must never resort to violence; the ends cannot justify the means when the former are material and the latter place souls in danger. He would have preferred the lessons in the *Vita Balderici* to those in Anselm's *Gesta pontificum Leodiensium*.¹¹⁹

The warrior-bishop was a creature that sprang from the policies of the imperial church. Paradoxically, writers that not merely admitted the martial activities of bishops but also sought to justify them, usually portrayed their actions as a last resort, and thus had to admit that no reliable secular authority (i.e., no emperor, king, or duke) was available to provide the necessary protection for the flock.¹²⁰ The practice of episcopal command of armies, along with the conceptual framework, found its way into the reform papacy by way of the Lotharingian popes of the 1050s. Even though the staunchest members of the *Reichskirche* first found a way to justify bishops as preservers of the peace, through force when necessary, it was the Gregorians who ended up taking the plunge of clearly advocating violence in the name of religion. From Bruno of Cologne to Notker and Wazo of Liège, to Pope Leo IX and ultimately to Gregory VII – or, if one prefers, from Ruotger to Anselm and the author of the *Vita Leonis*, to Anselm of Lucca and Bonizo of Sutri – the issue of the fighting bishop shows one of the ways in which the imperial church helped sow the seeds of its own destruction. The roots of papal holy war were not entirely papal.

In the face of the Gregorian polemic on the need to stand up to tyranny and oppression of the church, those on the imperial side developed an altogether pacifist approach to the problems between *regnum* and *sacerdotium*.¹²¹ That which was wrong with the church should be corrected through patient admonition, not through violent protest or revolution. This emphasis, I believe, goes a long way to help explain why, in the midst of the war of ideas, a monk at Liège would reinterpret the life of a bishop

¹¹⁸ Pseudo-Fulbert, p. 263. One wonders whether the statement (p. 269) that some appealed to those 'qui tamquam religiosi fuerint et tamen ab expeditionibus non abstinerint', might refer to individuals treated above. Pseudo-Fulbert does not seem to have drawn from Peter Damiani: above, n. 88.

¹¹⁹ The protection of widows and orphans was also evoked in the pacifist rhetoric of the imperial polemicists: e.g. Sigebert, *Epistola*, c. 4, p. 454 (from Isaiah X.1–2), and Wibert, *Decretum*, ed. E. Dümmler, *MGH Libelli de lite* 1, p. 625. Cf. Bonizo, *Liber de vita christiana* VII.28, p. 249, where the duty now belongs to the *milites* and is listed directly following their requirement to 'schismaticos et haeticos debellare'.

¹²⁰ Anselm and the *Vita Balderici* both portray events as if the emperor, or even his secular delegate, the duke, is unable to assume the responsibility of command. For Anselm this is easily explainable by the fact that Duke Godfrey the Bearded was the main rebel against imperial authority. The *Vita Balderici* comes from a time of unrest throughout Lotharingia, when emperors could not provide their bishops with the same level of protection as their predecessors had. See Reuter, 'Peace-Breaking, Feud, Rebellion, Resistance', pp. 369–71.

¹²¹ Robinson, *Authority and Resistance*, esp. pp. 89–113.

who lived nearly a century earlier as a condemnation of episcopal involvement in warfare.¹²² In the end, however, the warning of Matthew XXVI.52 that those who take up the sword shall perish by it was not enough to stop the floodgates of religious warfare opened by the papacy.¹²³ Instead, Jeremiah XLVIII.10 – a favourite verse of Gregory VII – was more apt for these times: ‘cursed be the one who withholds his sword from blood’.¹²⁴

The creation of a Christian warrior ethic is in large part a story of the eleventh century, and one certainly not confined to the regions treated above. By that century’s end, the concept of a *miles Christi* extended beyond a monk engaged in spiritual combat to include a soldier engaged in holy warfare in the name of the church.¹²⁵ Along the way, bishops on the ground were figuring out how to channel violence in useful ways. Though the bishops who instigated the ‘Peace and Truce of God’ came from lands with a different constellation of power than their colleagues in Lotharingia, and though their techniques and results show many differences, both groups similarly founded their rhetoric on the protection of the defenceless.¹²⁶ It was all part of an attempt to delineate good from bad force, where before there had only been degrees of bad. For this task bishops used spiritual sanctions, peace oaths sworn on relics, prayers and rituals to consecrate weapons and war banners, and, as we have seen, their own contingents. Military action had to be righteous at a time when the successors of the apostles were directing it. This largely clerical discourse on the warrior-bishop is still of course a long way from the glorified depiction of episcopal fighting and even blood-lust in vernacular epic, embodied in Roland’s Turpin or El Cid’s don Jerome.

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¹²² And it seems somehow significant that a mysterious Italian bishop would serve as the conduit for this lesson in the narrative. See above, n. 75. Even if some of the legendary details were not the exclusive invention of the author of the *Vita Balderici*, the figure of Bishop John – an ascetic who renders service to the emperor, is rewarded with a bishopric, which he refuses when the corrupt local lord stipulates that he must abandon his chastity through a marriage alliance with the lord’s daughter (!) – would seem an effective one to buttress the morals and mores of the imperial church.

¹²³ The line from Matthew served as Gratian’s lead in to the problem of ecclesiastical involvement in warfare; see above, n. 15.

¹²⁴ ‘Maledictus qui facit opus Domini fraudulenter et maledictus qui prohibet gladium suum a sanguine.’ Erdmann, *The Origin of the Idea of Crusade*, p. 180. According to Caspar’s index (*MGH Epistolae selectae* 2.2 (Berlin, 1923), pp. 645–6), the only biblical verse cited more frequently in Gregory’s *Register* is Matthew XVI.19.

¹²⁵ Articulated best by Guibert of Nogent, *Gesta Dei per Francos*, ed. R.B.C. Huygens, CCCM 127A (Turnhout, 1996), p. 87. For an overview of the developments, see E.-D. Hehl, ‘War, Peace and the Christian Order’, in D. Luscombe and J. Riley-Smith (eds), *The New Cambridge Medieval History*, vol. 4, c. 1024–1198, pt. 1 (Cambridge, 2004), pp. 185–228.

¹²⁶ Cf. above, n. 41, for occasions when bishops in France themselves directed peace militias. Peace statutes were promulgated at Liège and Cologne in the early 1080s in attempts to quell violence caused by the Investiture Controversy: ed. L. Wieland, *MGH Constitutiones* 1 (Hanover, 1893), pp. 603–5.