The cost of American higher education has drawn increasing interest in the 1990s, and with it the question of return on investment. State fiscal pressures have forced review of state programs that support higher education, particularly regarding public colleges and universities. Affordability concerns compete with access and quality issues as states realign spending priorities. In the five years between 1988 and 1993, states reduced the portion of the general fund spent on higher education from 14.6% to 12.2% (Layzell, 1994). Yet, facing forecasts for increasing demand, they don't want to see access and quality reduced and would like to see it improved.

One major focus of the cost issue has been on productivity, particularly that of the faculty. Studies of faculty workload and reporting systems in the past decade have produced a wealth of data on faculty work and comparisons with past years. Researchers and analysts have generated a great deal of discussion regarding the issues. While faculty point to long working hours, policy makers are challenging how that time is being used.

This paper examines faculty productivity factors and suggests actions to encourage greater faculty productivity and to realign state and higher education activities to better serve the social interest. This report is provided to support decision making and planning at the state board level. It examines some of the pressure for reform and the issues most closely associated with faculty productivity. Four policy options are suggested, two of which are endorsed==one long term and one short term. The preferred option would lead to substantial reform in the structure of faculty careers and incentives. Recommendations include both state-level and campus-level activities, describing an approach that state level practices must encourage if it is be successful.

Many states have moved to mandate productivity factors legislatively, or through their governing boards and coordinating boards for postsecondary education. Performance measures and standards, and accountability issues have taken the center for interactions between institutions and their state overseers. By 1992, over half the state governing boards and several state coordinating boards had established policies and standards on faculty workload. Legislative control has been extended over productivity issues in several states. Seven states have legislation addressing faculty teaching load, six address the number and types of positions, and five are concerned with use of part-time faculty and teaching assistants. Eight states have passed laws addressing faculty compensation, and four states have legislation on tenure and evaluation (Russell, 1992). It is clear that states want to assert greater control over the factors involved in productivity in higher education. Where control does not exist, observers are clear that it is very likely to occur if institutions cannot improve performance, and they point to the health care industry as an example (Layzell, 1994; Mingle, 1992; Pew Higher Education Roundtable, 1994).

The definition of productivity is not easily pinned down. For many, the term relates to return on investment. That is problematic in higher education, because the relationships among inputs and outputs, tangible and intangible, are complex and not always clear. (Layzell, 1994). Most faculty do understand their obligation to be productive, and they tend to define productive behavior as "being as good as they can be" (Massy, 1995). Productivity is a matter of continuous quality improvement, but they feel public needs and expectations are likely to exceed what can be done with the funding available (Banks, 1997). As a rule, faculty are suspicious of efforts to improve gross productivity, such as increasing the student-faculty ratio, and other, primarily quantitative reforms. They see inputs and outputs as being proportional to each other, and changes in proportion can only affect quality. As one researcher noted, "we found little in faculty definitions of productivity to suggest that faculty search actively and continually for ways to improve teaching quality while using few resources" (Massy, 1995). Faculty feel productivity is an issue of outputs, "rather than cheapening inputs such as expenditures on faculty" (Banks, 1997).

The question is not the amount of work performed by faculty. A 1987 comprehensive national survey of faculty revealed that, overall, they work an average of 53 hours per week, ranging from 57 hours in research universities to 47 hours in two-year institutions. They spend over half their time in teaching activities, and the remainder about evenly split among research, administrative duties, and community service and other. Student contact hours average about ten per week, ranging from 6.6 at research universities, to 15.2 at two-year colleges. In research and doctoral institutions there has been some growth over the past two decades in time spent on research, but it has been greatest at comprehensive institutions (Layzell, 1994).

The public image of the academy, as defined by the media, is one of privilege and arrogance, unresponsive to social needs. For the media the dominant perspective "is one of lumbering obsolescence; to them colleges and universities are dinosaurs trapped in the tar pits of political correctness and inefficient as well as self-serving attitudes and practices" (Pew Higher Education Roundtable, 1994, p.5A). Educators have not done a good job of helping the public understand what they do or why their priorities are important. The literature critical of the academy charges that faculty are at once too conservative and too liberal, selfish, lazy, poor teachers, lacking in intellectual skills, and poor researchers (Washington State Higher Education Coordinating Board, 1994). They have also failed to satisfy the critics of tenure, which is often seen as a sinecure and as an impediment to the flexibility needed to respond to changes in the culture.

Public higher education, as a state enterprise, traditionally has been granted more freedom and autonomy than other state agencies. At the very least, leaders want to confirm the tradeoff of accountability for autonomy. There is an unclear relationship among funding, output, and incentives. David Breneman (1993) points out that there is constant pressure "to expand activities, enter new arenas of inquiry, broaden the coverage of a field, undertake new investigations, recruit more students, serve new constituencies, and improve the quality of the institution," all of which maintains constant pressure on resources (p. 2). While educators, in this analog to classic entrepreneurs, want to obtain more in order to provide more and grow more==thereby becoming more productive, state leaders are seeking better for less==another kind of productivity.

William Massy (1990)has constructed a model for the way this force works, which he calls the "ratchet." It shows how faculty seek additional faculty lines and leverage their time with staff, technology, and teaching assistants. This allows them to reduce structure in the curriculum by subdividing courses into specializations and by expanding coverage of the discipline, reducing the average course enrollment by spreading out the same pool of students. The result is a reduction in the effective teaching load and an increase in unsponsored research, which is effectively funded by the institution. Further, once an improvement is created, it becomes an entitlement. While this process is, indeed, a move toward efficiency, quality, and a form of productivity, it does not result in any savings.

Factors in productivity

Different interpretations of productivity clearly arise from differing views of the purpose of higher education and the missions of institutions. As concepts of mission define faculty work , the conflicts between teaching and research define productivity. Central to both teaching and research is the academic discipline, toward which faculty are accused of focusing their productivity, at the expense of local needs. As local needs shift and change, and as faculty assert their autonomy in setting their own priorities, policy makers collide with the practice of academic tenure. Conflicting missions, teaching and research, loyalty to discipline, and academic tenure are the factors that substantially shape faculty productivity.

Different Missions

What has become clear in the furor, is that perceptions differ of the mission and role of the public institution, and this has far reaching implications for productivity. Eugene Rice (1996) outlines seven assumptions about the role of the academic professional, which evolved and solidified during the expansion period of 1957 to 1974. Those assumptions are:

1. Research is the central professional endeavor and focus of academic life.
2. Quality in the profession is maintained by peer review and professional autonomy.
3. Knowledge is pursued for its own sake.
4. The pursuit of knowledge is best organized by discipline (i.e., by discipline-based departments).
5. Reputations are established in national and international professional associations.
6. Professional rewards and mobility accrue to those who persistently accentuate their specializations.
7. The distinctive task of the academic professional is the pursuit of cognitive truth. (p. 8)

For faculty, a focus on research, where knowledge is constructed, takes the lead over teaching, yet teaching is what the public sees as the purpose of public higher education. Researchers comment that "most faculty in universities are well connected to the perceptions and satisfaction levels of their research communities but poorly connected to perceptions of students, parents, state taxpayers, the legislature, and those who employ their students" (Gilliland, 1997, p. 32). Productivity is often understood by faculty to refer to research output, but the public believes research and service are tangential to the teaching mission, and their value is not as widely understood. The public feels its interest lies in "college graduates who can get jobs and advance in given careers; education comparable to the tuition charged; solutions to state, social, economic concerns, including improved public school systems and meeting workforce training needs" (Layzell, 1994, p. 101). That service depends much more clearly on good teaching than on any of the assumptions above.

The American education system is clearly very diverse, and the missions vary among the sectors. The ideals, however, are set by the most prestigious institutions, and it is there that the rewards are most clearly allotted. Institutions try to emulate the "better" institutions, which tend to include the schools where faculty were trained, and schools that were highly regarded by those institutions. "Mission creep" and "upward drift" are terms describing an ongoing process that reinforces the research mission in higher education (Aldersley, 1995).

Ideas of mission remain unresolved because each position has been ineffective at selling its priorities to the other. As a result, each party defines productivity differently, and the clash frustrates all. The most visible conflict surrounds the activities of teaching and research.

Teaching and research

One of the major complaints has been that faculty emphasize research at the expense of teaching. It is dangerous to generalize too much, because the diversity of institutions offers a broad range in the degree of faculty involvement in research. Most faculty do not believe one occurs at the expense of the other, but that they are complementary. They believe one's teaching is informed by the research, and that it keeps the faculty member current in the discipline. For many, particularly at doctorate and research universities, the first order of business is the research. They bracket their teaching, giving it and the undergraduate students a satisfactory amount of attention, then direct their creative energies and efforts to their research (Massy, 1995).

It may not be true in many cases that research does support teaching in the short term. A review of 29 studies shows that the quality of research made less than a 2% contribution to quality of teaching (Gardiner, 1994, p. 141). Studies cited by Ernest Boyer (1990) show that publication, which is the end product of the research, and pressure to publish can interfere with teaching. Over a third of the sample agreed that pressure to publish reduces the quality of teaching. The greatest agreement was among faculty under 40, who are most likely to experience the pressure. Less than half of all faculty disagreed with the statement (p. 48).

The process of becoming a faculty member, obtaining the terminal degree, is an immersion in the research methodology of the discipline. One in twelve new faculty in comprehensive and liberal arts colleges, regarded as primarily teaching institutions, would prefer to be doing more research than they are (1 in 8 are actual doing research at those institutions). Among senior faculty, 1 in 15 want to do more. Overall, women are doing just over half the research of men, and are half again as interested as men in doing more. Overall, new faculty are slightly more interested in doing more research than senior faculty (Schuster, 1997, p. 5).

Certainly, the incentives follow the researcher. According to the 1987 faculty survey, lower salaries correlate to time in teaching and instruction, and time in the classroom. Higher salaries correlate to publication and time doing research (Layzell, 1994). In 1969, 21% of faculty in all sectors said it was difficult to get tenure without publishing; by 1989 the figure had doubled to 42%. The biggest jumps occurred in the premier teaching sectors: comprehensive institution pressures went from 6% to 43%, and pressure on liberal arts campuses went from 6% to 24% (Boyer, 1990, p. 12). A 1994 study shows that less than 10% of faculty at 392 institutions believed they were rewarded for being good teachers (Gardiner, 1994, p. 137). It remains true, however, that the vast majority of faculty prefer to teach than research, and they would rather be evaluated on the basis of teaching effectiveness than on their research and publication (Russell, 1992, p. 11).

At the heart of both teaching and research is the academic discipline. It defines the life and practice of faculty, some feel, to excess.

Disciplinary loyalty

Faculty are often accused of placing more emphasis and loyalty in their disciplines than in their employing institutions. This emphasis suggests discipline priorities crowd out local needs, again reducing productivity as defined by much of the public. An outgrowth of many factors, devotion to discipline is inherent in the structures and reward systems of higher education. Faculty are clustered in departments by discipline, and their advancement depends upon their work in the discipline as assessed by department colleagues==not necessarily their work in support of the institution and its mission. Options for moving to another institution are dependent upon standing in the national perspective of the discipline. For their own interests, faculty perceive themselves as part of the whole system of higher education, not limited to the particular institution or sector to which they currently belong (Russell, 1992, p. 11).

The clustering of activity by discipline has a number of consequences. In addition to reinforcing research activity, it creates an immutable unit that resists change and tends to aggrandize its position. Burton Clark (1987) recognized the power of departments as a counter to excessive central control. "Unabashedly committed to the single discipline, the department provides a supporting environment for master specialists and their apprentices at whatever cost to the integrated learning of neophytes. And it is particularly the power of disciplines behind departments that diminishes managerial hierarchy inside academic organizations" (p. 64). Other researchers say academic departments "are considered permanent, department boundaries are rigid, and work priorities are relatively constant. Thus, universities find it difficult to adjust by changing faculty priorities or by reorganizing" (Gilliland, 1997, p. 32).

The department is the locus of security for the faculty member, particularly after achieving tenure. Many among the public feel that security allows faculty to disregard calls to improve productivity.

Tenure and review

As a factor in productivity, the institution of tenure for faculty is a very popular target. Attacks on tenure have increased in the past decade, and there are serious attempts to call it into question. There are faculty who do not feel it is important. In a 1995 survey of faculty attitudes, "more than a third of the roughly 34, 000 professors interviewed agreed 'strongly' or 'somewhat' that "tenure is an outmoded concept." That figure was slightly higher than in 1989 (Leatherman, 1996, p. 1A). Typically, those without tenure and that half of the professoriate that is part-time, tend to be more skeptical of the practice. In addition, some members of protected classes have regarded tenure as an impediment to diversity because it constrains turnover (Chait, 1995, p. 5).

It may not be true, however, that tenure works against productivity. In a 1991 study, "The data provide no evidence of a decline in research productivity with increasing rank or with the achievement of tenure" (Chait, 1995, p. 8). Also, one study showed "no appreciable differences in classroom hours among tenured, tenure-track, and non-tenure-track faculty (8.8 to 9.8), but all had fewer classroom hours than faculty at institutions without tenure systems" (13.5) (p. 9). A statement on productivity from the leaders of the faculty senates and faculty unions of the State University of New York and the California State University agrees that, "Tenure is an assurance of academic quality and institutional integrity. It is not a barrier to academic productivity or to responsible management" (Banks, 1997, p. 6).

Tenure does, however, create some difficult problems for higher education management in periods of fiscal constraint. Tenure's detractors see it as a fiscal problem: if people can't be turned out, they remain until they obtain quite high salaries and eventually collect big pensions. They see tenure as limiting the institution's flexibility, since a tenure decision represents a commitment to a specialty for twenty years into an uncertain future. They may also see tenure at the core of dual governance: if you can't fire people, they don't have to obey you; if they won't obey you, you can't govern without their participation.

Tenure has had, to this point, nearly universal acceptance within the American academic community, the sine qua non of academic credibility. The degree of protection is absolute and no creative variations are allowed (or not many). Contractual frameworks offering equal protection, which few might be expected to do, are always negotiable, always subject to creative variation. Most faculty feel that if tenure falls, both academic freedom and dual governance will be vulnerable, no matter how much due process there is in place. Richard Chait (1995)points out that, "Whatever promise contract systems may hold in theory, the benefits of turnover simply have not been harvested in practice. . . . [One president said] 'We do not have a tenure system as a policy; what we have is far worse: tenure from day one'" (p. 9).

The shape of an academic career is at once created and protected by tenure. There is a decade of educational investment, and another decade or more of gaining mastery. There is an "apprentice" period of graduate assistantship or instructor or lecturer, and a "journeyman" period of junior faculty==a commitment demanded by few other occupations. Once prepared, there is no real option for setting up one's own shop as a medical or legal professional might. "Transportability" of one's skills and abilities becomes negligible at about the ten-year mark, except for nationally recognized stars who can attract other scholars and outstanding students. The functioning of the academy is standardized more than almost any other industry, so much so that faculty positions carry a standard set of similar responsibilities and compensations within a given sector. It is very difficult for faculty to accept a position at lower rank or salary, nor would one be offered normally, since it implies a certain degree of failure. Any cross-training to a more employable related field requires at least a new "journeyman" period of several years and considerable research in that field. A turned-out scholar has few options.

Some states have moved to modify tenure, but not without major battles that can cost the institutions in the state dearly in terms of faculty recruiting power. Most college presidents stand with faculty regarding the tenure issue, primarily because withdrawal of tenure would put them at a serious disadvantage in the national market for the strongest faculty. To date, no state-wide initiatives have succeeded in eliminating tenure at public institutions. In June, 1997, Minnesota faculty and regents agreed to a post-tenure review procedure for faculty with unsatisfactory ratings in annual reviews. They also agreed to permit reassignment if programs are cut, giving the state some of the flexibility needed (Minnesota Planning, 1997, p. 18).

Post-tenure review has received mixed reviews, particularly where it is not pursued as serious evaluation. The American Association of University Professors (AAUP) believes that "periodic formal institutional evaluation of each postprobationary faculty member would bring scant benefit, would incur unacceptable costs, not only in money and time but also in dampening of creativity and of collegial relationships, and would threaten academic freedom (Committee A on Academic Freedom and Tenure (AAUP), 1997, p. 44). The AAUP statement does provide ten standards for good practice, but notably argues, "Among other things, we reject any demand for 'accountability' that takes the form of a belief that faculty members are properly subject to administrative criticism, let alone discipline, for teaching or research that is regarded by some to be misguided, ill-informed or out-of-step with institutional trends or priorities" (p. 45). It argues that such focus "is inconsistent with the very core of academic freedom."

These issues==mission, research and teaching, loyalty to the discipline, and academic tenure==mark the ground for action and change in attempts to improve productivity. If productivity is to be improved, policy potions must address these factors.

Policy Options

The four policy options include maintaining the status quo, directly attacking factors in productivity on campuses, holding institutions accountable, and reshaping the faculty environment. The last two options are short-term and long-term considerations.

Status quo

There is no consistency on a national basis regarding current practice and policy. A status quo option suggests continuing to do what is currently done. Arguments for this course rely upon a conviction that productivity, however defined, is acceptable or improving, and that institutions and faculty will respond to current state initiatives. Arguments against this course insist that new initiatives are needed in order that the system respond more positively to current and future needs.

Attack productivity factors directly

This option, which appears to be attractive in several states, involves mandates regarding mission, workload in teaching and research, departmental and curricular structures, and tenure and evaluation. The beauty of this option is that it requires little negotiation and explicitly communicates the governing body's values. It clearly communicates who is in charge, and it leaves little ambiguity. It does, however, require infallible leadership (cf. centralized economies). It is also seriously contentious, it reduces vitality and initiative, and it could easily undermine quality within the system.

As attractive though it may be to some, most commentators believe directly attacking the issues is counter-productive. They argue that the costs of micro-management are too high, that by the state assuming responsibility for managerial choices, such as workload, the campus abdicates much of its own responsibility. One study points out, "It is doubtful that further studies of faculty workload or instructional productivity will provide any greater insight into these issues. It is also highly likely that legislative actions such as mandated teaching loads would further alienate the faculty from their external stakeholders with no resulting benefit for students" (Layzell, 1994, p. 98). William Massy notes, "While one can question the faculty activity mix, direct assaults on work hours seem to us to be basically unfair. Moreover, these assaults seem more likely to inhibit than to further needed change" (Massy, 1995, p. 14). David Breneman (1993)suggests, "Faculty members enjoy considerable autonomy in the use of their time, and are unlikely to respond well to heavy-handed approaches to change; a judicious mix of new incentives, explanation, persuasion, bribery, and fear of consequences will be necessary" (p. 14). As one research report noted, "Our suspicion is that if required to teach more, rather than to teach differently, most faculty would add an additional specialized course or split a current course into two parts rather than teach more general education or introductory courses. The result would be increased teaching loads but not reduced expenditures" (Pew Higher Education Roundtable, 1994, p. 10A).

Hold institutions accountable

If continuing current practice and directly attacking factors in productivity are not acceptable, more strategic planning must be engaged. A short term answer is to respect the autonomy and authority of the institution, but to set goals and parameters for its operation, reinforcing them with incentive programs. Frank Newman (1987)suggests that, "At its best, the relationship between the state and the state university is an appropriate effort by those elected and appointed to state office to set goals, allocate resources, hold accountable, and encourage those who govern the state university" (p. 453). In some states this is already the status quo alternative.

It is quite difficult for state leaders to "get to" that private life in the institution. Jones and Ewell (1993) point out that policymakers are "many layers removed" from those structures that actually affect quality in the institution, and they note the difficulty in influencing practice directly through state policy (Jones & Ewell, 1993). Even the governing board of the institution represents an intervening layer between the state and institutional practices. One of the board's primary responsibilities is to "protect the public interest in higher education by protecting the campus from improper external intrusion as well as ensuring that narrow institutional interests are not served at the expense of legitimate public needs" (Hines, 1988).

Jones and Ewell (1993) believe that "Opportunities to foster good practice can be promoted by changing constraints and incentives in the external environment and by cultivating the particular cultures in which these practices flourish" (Jones & Ewell, 1993). David Breneman (1993) suggests, "The highly decentralized and collegial process of much university decision-making argues for methods that preserve as much local autonomy as possible, within the context of a guiding vision and clearly defined budget constraints". He argues for outcome goals for departments, streamlining of offerings, and differentiation of missions. (p. 15)

The advantage of this approach is that it keeps its distance from most of those grounds which faculty feel belong to them. Yet, it does put pressure on the institution to produce within some narrow guidelines. This does not occur without some contest for authority, but it minimizes direct intervention in institutional practices at the core level.

Reshaping the faculty environment.

James Mingle ( 1992) maintains "there is no reason to believe that with some imagination we cannot both protect the autonomy of faculty to define their own agenda as well as gain greater commitment to institutional and state objectives" (p. 12). If holding institutions accountable is a near-term answer, the long-term answer may be to reshape the environment in which faculty are socialized and work.

This approach requires that faculty be understood as assets. As problematic as this conception may be on some counts, faculty do represent considerable value to the institution and the state. Fundamental to the use of assets are concerns for their development, maintenance, protection, and enhancement, and for their appropriate application for the greatest benefit of the organization (Layzell, 1994). Researchers affirm that faculty expectations of their role are shaped by both the institutional environment and their disciplines. These are reinforced by the reward structures. Given that each faculty member becomes more unique as she or he accumulates life experience, institutions might do well to consider how they might help shape that experience. Clearly this is a longer-term and more involved solution, building an entirely new generation of faculty.

This conception of developing faculty as long-term assets leads to support and encouragement for restructuring academic careers, and to revised faculty development programs. Many faculty might be encouraged to spend sabbaticals, summer, or other time in commercial or governmental environments, for instance, to refresh their perspectives, while others can be given assignments that will develop their expertise in areas where it will most enhance their value as assets. This asset development approach corresponds to support for faculty vitality, which underpins faculty productivity (Clark, 1985).

The human asset idea also leads to the need to move faculty toward greater productivity while respecting their autonomy. Researchers have learned that the strongest predictors of faculty productivity are factors having to do with the degree of competence one feels in the task, the degree of effort one would like to make, and the degree of effort the institution expects. Faculty behavior is determined by the interaction of institutional expectations with one's sense of competence and desire to perform (Blackburn, 1995). Institutions can consciously enter this process by supporting faculty in developing their competence, and by providing incentives to encourage the personal choice to perform.

Of the options offered above, the last two==holding institutions accountable, and reshaping the faculty environment==appear the most useful. Further, both strategies may be pursued at once. The following recommendations are based upon these options.

Recommendations

The recommendations focus both on the institution and on the faculty. Several analysts have provided thoughtful approaches and recommendations that can shape these options:

a) Faculty and higher education leaders must accept a need for change, not just better public relations. This would be encouraged by greater education levels on the campuses about the environmental pressures for change.

b) Higher education leaders must collaborate with the stakeholders in clarifying social needs and expectations.

c) A coalition of higher education leaders and stakeholders must "identify and achieve consensus on higher education's role in meeting state goals" (Layzell, 1994]. Simply stated, but a tremendously difficult task.

d) "Upon agreement of higher education's responsibilities for meeting state goals, state government leaders must retreat, and campus administrators and faculty should determine new assignments. Higher education must have the flexibility to reorganize and renegotiate faculty roles and responsibilities, and this must be done with the full participation of the faculty." (Layzell, 1994, p. 102)

e) A critical discussion among all stakeholders, but particularly between the state policy makers and the institutions, will address ways to constrain curriculum without destroying faculty imagination, creativity, and ownership, and without sacrificing the competitive position of programs. The practices in Massy's "ratchet" are not undesirable in themselves, but the overall effect and dynamic works against productivity as defined by the public.

These recommendations shape the environment. Other changes are needed to shape faculty work:

f) Provide opportunities for alternative career structures.

In Scholarship Reconsidered, Ernest Boyer (1990) encouraged open career paths that would offer more variety and growth than the typical career outlined above. Faculty would be more productive if their energies could be focused in different directions in different periods of their careers. Boyer suggested rewards should acknowledge and exploit the phases of academic careers. It is evident that the three faculty ranks (assistant professor, associate professor, professor) provide insufficient career landmarking or incentives for development, as steps and raises and position mobility offer in other industries. In terms of undergraduate teaching alone, there is little a faculty member can accrue through longevity that would make her or him demonstrably more valuable than less experienced faculty. Boyer wanted to allow faculty to adjust rewards and professional goals in 3-5 year periods. Departments and institutions would develop "creativity contracts" to allow focus on different forms of scholarship at different times in a faculty career. He noted that early career is the most productive period for research and publication, and faculty should be encouraged to thoroughly refine their understandings in their field, to network, and to attend conferences in their field. In a later phase, the focus shifts to scholarship of teaching and learning. The reward structure would provide recognition for development in this activity. If the individual is capable, she or he would shift later to leadership roles, such as department chair, or would lead development of teaching. Incentives would also be provided.

Implicit in this process is a development that the academy has resisted for some time. It would create an environment in which there would be a diversity of rewards and responsibilities for faculty. Many institutions have resisted allowing this circumstance or acknowledging it where it exists. The employment market may drive pay differences among fields, but equity is the prevailing mode once a faculty member is hired. Even merit pay systems are poorly accepted among faculty, because of the competition they engender and their potential misuse to punish faculty who expound unpopular ideas. Nevertheless, James Mingle (1992) argues, "like American business, we are going to have to 'customize' our delivery system, not to eliminate the model of faculty as researcher, but to add equally-competitive and attractive models that will motivate and reward different kinds of productivity to serve society's needs (p. 12).

g) Revise reward structures to support open careers, and institutional and system goals.

These changes can only occur if incentives are in place. How they are to be applied must be well conceived and clear. Faculty want guidance that is supported by incentives. Faculty responses to concerns for productivity note that, "Governing boards, academic administration, and faculty governance bodies need to be clear about the mix of expectations of the faculty for teaching, scholarship and service, and must provide support and rewards accordingly, including compensation and promotions" (Banks, 1997, p. 4). Because the department is the faculty "home," it must reinforce the expectations. At the institution level, William Massy (1990)says, "Provosts and deans need to communicate to departments that they are going to be rewarded or punished according to their teaching as well as their research productivity" (p. 37). He adds that it is wrong to put it all on the individual faculty member.

h) Support faculty development that coincides with institutional goals.

In industry, it is common practice to select strong individuals, assign them different or expanded responsibilities, and provide them with extensive training at the expense of the firm, along with incentive funding and paid time away from the job. This is done with rarity for academic faculty, who may obtain a little support to attend a conference or an occasional workshop. With very rare exception on most campuses, faculty will elect to spend their sabbaticals and professional development time and energies in their own disciplines, but improvements in productivity will require development in other areas, as well. If a faculty member were to spend part of a semester or a summer researching and developing pedagogical and curriculum practices, or working in the industry to which his or her students are targeted, it follows that the qualitative contribution upon return would likely boost productivity by most measures. Although it would not necessarily reduce costs in the short term, in the long term it would likely affect curriculum choices, and permit better priority determination within constrained resources. Some institutions provide some limited support for redirection of work, and many are "redeveloped" and renewed into highly productive faculty. Usually, however, incentives are poor or absent and the faculty most in need of development are not encouraged. Programs generally need to be more coherent, more pervasive, and more imaginative.

Such investment in supplemental training has other benefits. It's a significant gesture of commitment and support by the institution to the work of a faculty member and sends a clear message about priorities. If loyalty to the institution is less evident than it should be, the commitment of the institution to the development of the individual faculty member as an asset can engender it.

A caveat: in all of this, the faculty must be active participants. Faculty leaders in California and New York insist, "Faculty can be most productive only when they participate in establishing the activities and values supported by their institutions (Banks, 1997, p. 7). Current dual governance practices on most campuses require that faculty become part of the process in these decisions; it is critical to observe this or efforts to improve productivity will unquestionably fail. It will not go easily. Faculty will resist any idea that they are being shaped, managed, or otherwise manipulated in a deliberate way. However, if direct intervention regarding faculty behavior inevitably brings conflict, how much better it would be to shape and encourage them in appropriate directions from the outset, treating their socialization rather than their behavior. As the Pew researchers concluded following their own assessment,

Ideas simple enough in outline: make institutions less labor-intensive; simplify the curriculum; transform departments into instructional collectives. Together these actions would help to bring about institutions that are more nimble, more capable of responding collectively to shifts in markets and public attitudes as well as to changes in technology and the competition of alternate suppliers of postsecondary education. None of these changes can be commanded, legislated, or regulated. They must instead come from the sense of internal discontent that, when combined with external inducements, yields a purposeful recasting of institutional functions (Pew Higher Education Roundtable, 1994, p. 11A).<>

Summary

Faculty productivity has taken a prominent position as state policy makers search for ways to reduce investment in public institutions. Many states have moved to control faculty workload and other factors in productivity.

Productivity is difficult to define, and its meaning differs between faculty and the public. Faculty link productivity to quality, and they see a fixed relationship between costs and benefits, particularly in terms of quality. Faculty do work hard, with an average 53-hour work week, and they understand the need to be productive. Disagreement appears on the focus of that work.

There are natural forces within the academic department that encourage expansion, subdividing of the curriculum, and increasing specialization. It is possible for faculty to reduce their effective teaching load, while becoming more productive in their own terms, but it does not result in fiscal savings.

Faculty and stakeholders differ in how they see their purpose. Faculty focus on research and traditional academic values, while the public wants an educational experience that leads to employment. They also differ on the relative importance of teaching and research; with the greater incentives going to research. For career and other reasons, faculty tend to pay a great deal of attention to their disciplines, sometimes at the expense of local priorities. Tenure is also subject to criticism, though there's little evidence of its effect on productivity. Post-tenure review is one option currently being explored, to assist faculty in improving their productivity.

Policy options include the status quo, attacking productivity factors directly, holding institutions accountable, and reshaping the faculty environment. Most commentators warn against direct attacks, but they endorse holding institutions accountable for their productivity. Reshaping the career environment for faculty would offer the greatest long term benefit. If faculty are regarded as an institutional asset, a new range of considerations focuses on developing, maintaining, and effectively deploying those assets most beneficially.

Recommendations include: (a) acceptance of the need for change by faculty and campus leadership, (b) collaboration between higher education leaders and stakeholders in determining the social needs, (c) identification and consensus between higher education leaders and stakeholders on higher education's role, (d) withdrawal of state presence from campus, allowing campus leaders and faculty to shape their own response, (e) finding ways to constrain curriculum growth where expansion may not be fully warranted, (f) encouragement of more open career paths for faculty; (g) revision of reward structures to support and encourage career alternatives, (h) support for faculty development that coincides with institutional goals. Faculty must be thoroughly involved in the process.

The implementation of these recommendations must be incremental and evolving. The possibility of moving an entire state public higher education system in radical new directions at the same time seems very remote. It is likely, however, that if comparable inducements can be established, the structure of faculty careers can be redefined over the next twenty years as much as occurred during the 1960s and 1970s. If so, the productivity of our institutions of higher education will be markedly improved, faculty careers will be enhanced, and public campuses will be more efficient and effective==and productive by everyone's meaning==than they are today.

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